Russia uses various means to influence public opinion both in its own country and at the international level. These means include not only “positive propaganda” but also complex “information operations”. The Jamestown Foundation wrote about this in more detail.

For a long time, the main line of Russian propaganda was to propagate the idea that truth is different or even non-existent. The main methods of such operations include spreading disinformation, manipulating ideas, exacerbating existing social conflicts, and discrediting the fundamental values and institutions of democratic societies.

The combination of cynicism and ideology led to the emergence of a unique Russian phenomenon known as “ideological cynicism”, where “geopolitics” became a cult without regard to moral guidelines or principles.

In addition, Russian propaganda uses contradictions in Western countries and between governments, as well as politicians' avoidance of real problems, to cause discord and deepening social polarization.

The most effective tools in these information operations have become “ideologies for export”, the essence of which is the creation of “mini-ideologies” — individual, often self-contradictory worldviews for different social groups. However, they can be countered through exposure and refutation.

By identifying the underlying strategies that underpin Russian propaganda, the West can develop more effective methods to counter Russian information operations and reduce global support for Russian aggression against Ukraine.

The Kremlin promotes disinformation through the Nigerian publication THE NATION, the Senegalese SENE NEWS, and the Egyptian El Mostaqbal. This was reported by the Center for Countering Disinformation under the National Security and Defense Council.

• THE NATION, for example, published an article about the alleged sale by the Office of the President of Ukraine of land to the Soros Foundation in order to bury chemical waste.

• SENE NEWS publishes “investigative articles” about Ukraine with links to anonymous sources or fictitious journalists.

• El Mostaqbal quotes Russian officials accusing Ukraine and spreading narratives about “biological laboratories” or that “Ukraine is a US puppet”, for example.

Considering that the fakes on the analyzed resources have not received significant publicity among the international community, unlike the Russian information space, we can conclude that Russian propaganda uses these media to increase the confidence of the Russian domestic population in false information. Like, “even foreign media are writing about this!”.

You can read more about how Russia promotes its narratives through African media in a joint study by the Center for Countering Disinformation and the Molfar OSINT agency.

Propagandists spreading pro-Russian rhetoric on social networks claim that Ukraine is preparing a film “The History of the Black Sea”. They say that this film will show the Ukrainian myth that the Black Sea was dug by the ancient Ukrainians, who, according to assumptions, inhabited the territory of Ukraine. However, this is fake.

Analysts from the StopFake project drew attention to it. They found out that Ukrainian scientists had never put forward such a theory. Moreover, already 9 years ago they refuted a fake paragraph from a Ukrainian textbook, according to which the ancestors of Ukrainians allegedly dug up the Black Sea. Then the project specialists noted that the textbook and its author, to whom the propagandists referred, did not exist. Russian propaganda is trying to spread new narratives on this topic, using fake images and information, including fictitious data about the film's budget and ratings.

By spreading such fakes, propagandists want to create a false image of Ukrainians as a nation that does not have its own history, but invents it. They say that this is why such projects as a film about the dredged up Black Sea are being made, supposedly financed at public expense. Detector Media has already explained how else Russian propaganda instrumentalizes Ukrainian history for its own purposes.

Russian Foreign Ministry representative Mariia Zakharova is promoting the narrative that turbulence in Ukraine is growing, and that election campaigns are even starting to gain power in the country. Officials and those in power allegedly do not take into account ordinary Ukrainians, many of whom are on the brink of survival, and think only about their own benefit.

This message was recorded by the Center for Countering Disinformation. Such statements from a representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry are nothing more than an attempt to root the opinion in Ukrainian society about internal conflicts among the top leadership of Ukraine. On the other hand, propaganda resources continue to discredit the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyi and refer to the statement about the inappropriateness of elections in Ukraine under martial law. Finally, the enemy aims to sow fear, uncertainty and doubt among the Ukrainian society regarding the possible course of action in the country, using one of the propaganda tactics.

Anti-colonialism is a term used to describe various resistance movements against colonialism and imperialism. This is opposition to the policy of conquest of one country by another, its territory and peoples, political, economic and cultural enslavement. To become the leader of the Global South and anti-colonialism, Russia discredits Ukraine, although it itself is essentially the first among isolated dictatorships.

Russia instrumentalizes positive memories of the Soviet Union and its support for African wars of independence against Western colonialists. It uses positive memories of the past to enhance its influence now. On December 2, 2022, on the International Day for the Abolition of Slavery, the official Twitter account of the Russian Embassy in South Africa stated the following text: “Russia was one of the few world states that did not have colonies in Africa or other places and did not participate in the slave trade throughout its entire history. Russia did its best to help the peoples of the African continent gain freedom and sovereignty”. However, they are silent about information about the conquest of the peoples of Asia and Eastern Europe, because this contradicts the agenda of Russia, which positions itself as a fight against colonialism. Not to mention the war of aggression in Ukraine. Moreover, Russian propaganda does not mention the significant presence of Wagner group on the African continent, representing the interests of Russia and defending the Kremlin’s plans.

After Germany announced its readiness to transfer Leopard tanks to Ukraine, Putin said that Russia was forced to “repel the aggression of the collective West”. This term appeared in Putin’s rhetoric in 2021, but in the public space back in the early 2000s. By contrasting itself with the event, Russian propaganda puts pressure on the painful past of African countries that were at one time enslaved by European empires. Russian propaganda was able to present Russia’s war in Ukraine not as an aggressive one, but as a defensive one, in response to Western aggression. Allegedly, the Russian people have a special task to save the Ukrainians, because they oppose them and are waging an anti-imperial struggle against “Western oppression” - the same as the countries of Africa are waging.

At the end of January 2023, Russian Foreign Minister Serhii Lavrov arrived in Angola on a working visit. Then he made a statement to the media in which he compared the war in Ukraine with the war in Angola. During a meeting with Angolan Foreign Minister Tete  Antonio, Lavrov emphasized that “Russian-speaking Ukrainians” need Moscow’s protection, because Kyiv is biased against them.

On August 3, 2023, the speaker of the Russian State Duma, Viacheslav Volodin, wrote in his Telegram channel that “the USA, Great Britain and France must compensate African states for the damage caused” and this issue should be considered by the UN. He also accuses the United States and a number of Western countries of the fact that “colonial interests have not disappeared anywhere. Only the methods change”. Russian propaganda uses reflection tactics to make the same accusations against the West that they make against Russia itself, and to divert attention from the subject matter, which is the war in Ukraine and Russia's occupation of Ukrainian territories and enslavement of the Ukrainian people.

It is worth mentioning the grain. Russia not only allegedly “protects” Ukraine, but also devalues it as a partner. For African republics, Russian propaganda spreads narratives that Ukrainian grain, which is supposed to save them from famine, does not reach countries in need, but ends up in Europe as animal feed. Such statements were promoted, in particular, during the Second Russia-Africa Summit, held on July 27-28 in St. Petersburg. Thus, Russian propaganda discredits Ukraine and the Black Sea Grain Agreement and seeks to worsen its relations with Africa.

Russia plays the role of the poor heir to the former USSR empire. It has never recognized that the territories it has captured are colonies, and always justifies its actions by “voluntary annexation”, for example in the case of the Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Luhansk and Kherson regions temporarily occupied by Russia, or by the spread of the so-called “progressive Russian culture”, the fight against Nazism, etc. However, no matter what words Russian propaganda chooses, in fact, Moscow’s policy is the genocide of Ukrainians, the destruction of Ukrainian culture and the seizure of territories.

Russia now acts as a champion of justice and defender of enslaved peoples and victims of colonialism due to the fact that it is still not perceived as a colonial empire, and falsely pretends to be a friend of the African continent. Russian propaganda spreads anti-colonial messages that are pleasant to hear for African leaders and residents, and therefore gain adherence and can manipulate their opinions.

Russian propagandists use the themes of economic problems in the world, increasing tariffs in Ukraine and energy costs to intimidate Ukrainians and force them to end the war in any way (on Russia’s terms, abandoning territories seized by Russian occupiers) and to increase the spirit of the pro-Russian audience.

Last year, propaganda cables spread the message that the world economy would collapse unless sanctions against Russia and Russian businessmen were lifted and conceded on the front. Russian propaganda uses intimidation tactics to cause fear in people and get what they want: sanctions were lifted from Russia, and Ukraine recognized the occupied east and part of the south as Russian territories. It seems that this will help maintain the economy and prices. However, the whole world and Ukraine adapted to the new conditions, of course, not without increasing tariffs, but the economy turned out to be more flexible than the Russians expected. However, Russia itself has learned to circumvent sanctions.

Russian propaganda spread messages to Russians and residents of temporarily occupied Ukrainian territories about improving life in contrast to the “decadent” and supposedly impoverished Ukraine. Allegedly, with Russia, utilities become cheaper, Ukrainian companies that took out loans during the occupation may not repay them, and people who need medical care in Nova Kakhovka travel for free to a safe place for treatment. Here propagandists use love bombing tactics. Russian propaganda is trying to convince people that they need to support Russia, because it cares about them. Propagandists also use the tactic of repeated repetition - they repeat the narrative many times about the “piece of paradise” that populated areas supposedly become after the arrival of the Russians. They just keep silent about the fact that they are destroying Ukrainian cities and killing Ukrainians. About those territories that the Russians failed to occupy, propaganda deliberately spreads narratives about crisis, decline, and describes the worst-case scenario, causing fear among people. “Financial problems in Ukraine indicate that in the fall the economy will go into a steep decline and default”, they wrote in one of the telegram channels.

Russian propaganda also tried to show that the sanctions imposed on Russia for allowing a full-scale war in Ukraine are disadvantageous for the whole world, because protests are taking place in different countries, especially in the countries of the European Union. Propagandists spread many versions that “soon gas will be at $4,000 and oil at $200”, “in the coming days the price of gas in Europe will be very interesting” and disseminated information about what saving measures can be taken in connection with the rise in prices of energy carriers. Moreover, sometimes Russians even equated economic means of pressure on them with the destruction of the Russian people. Thus, Russian propaganda tried to manipulate and make the audience feel guilty, to intimidate readers, to impose the opinion that Russia influenced the world agenda and without cooperation with it, Europe and the whole world simply cannot exist.

Every year, thousands of Jewish Hasidic pilgrims come to the city of Uman, Cherkasy region, to celebrate the Jewish new year Rosh Hashanah at the grave of Rabbi Nachman, the founder of Bratslav Hasidism, who died in 1810. Ukraine was expecting 50,000 Israeli believers this year, despite the Israeli Prime Minister urging them to postpone the trip. The reason for this clause was Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russian propagandists use the Hasidic pilgrimage theme to portray Ukrainians as anti-Semitic, intimidate pilgrims, and worsen relations between Ukraine and Israel.

Last year, Russian propaganda stated that it could not ensure the safe stay of Hasidic Jewish pilgrims in Uman. That same year, Russian propagandists came up with a new message: Ukraine would deliberately attack pilgrims in Uman in order to obtain military assistance from Israel, including air defense systems. On April 28, 2023, Russia fired rockets at a 9-story building in the city of Uman, killing 23 people. Thus, Russian propagandists are trying to make a scapegoat out of Ukraine, absolving themselves of responsibility for the crimes of the Russians. Ukraine does not resort to terrorist methods to obtain weapons from Western partners, but acts exclusively along the diplomatic path.

The Russian Ministry of Defense disseminated information that Ukraine allegedly uses synagogues for military purposes. It is not true. This statement was commented on by the head of the Rabbi Nachman International Charitable Foundation, Nathan Ben Nun, and the head of the Jewish rescue organization Hatzalah Ukraine, Rabbi Hillel Cohen, who noted that “all shrines and religious objects of the Hasidic society are used exclusively for their intended purpose, namely for carrying out religious rituals and helping people”. Thus, Russian propaganda is trying to discredit the Defense Forces by disseminating information that Ukrainian military personnel are based in religious buildings, and to legitimize attacks on civilian infrastructure, residential buildings, and cultural monuments.

In Moldovan anonymous telegram channels broadcasting pro-Kremlin rhetoric, a message appeared that supposedly all conveniences were being created for Hasidim, while other citizens were not allowed to visit the airport. “Smacks of discrimination, doesn’t it?” – they wrote in one of the telegram channels. In fact, in order to eliminate all risks, access to the airport is currently limited to airport employees and passengers with airline tickets. Thus, Russian propaganda is trying to cause a negative attitude towards believers and stir up anti-Semitic sentiments, and discourage Hasidim from ever coming to Ukraine again.

“40 to 60” or “60 to 40” is a propaganda method in which 60% of the information is true, and 40% is manipulative. Propagandists create media that work on this principle and position themselves as an objective, independent or alternative source of information. By spreading true news, propaganda media ingratiates themselves with the reader, which encourages him or her to turn off critical thinking and swallow the other 40% of misinformation. It is often presented as something that the authorities are hiding from society and conspiracy theories. The proportion of truth and misinformation can vary in one direction or another depending on the media.

During World War II, this method was used by Joseph Goebbels, who headed the Ministry of Propaganda and Public Education of the Third Reich. On his instructions, an “anti-Nazi” English-language radio station was created, the announcer of which was William Joyce (a British man who supported Nazism and fled to Germany with his wife). At the time, radio was vital to the British public and the BBC was heavily censored, so English-language radio was seen as an alternative. William Joyce began broadcasts with the phrase “Germany is calling, Germany is calling”, read out genuine news from newspapers purchased in neutral countries (60%), and disseminated information about the dizzying successes and victories of Germany (40%). He reported that Germany wanted peace and was not going to bomb women and children in Great Britain, but the British left no choice and forced the Reich to violence. He also ridiculed Winston Churchill and tried to convince the British public that only the destruction of the British Prime Minister would save them from violence and give them a chance to reach an agreement.

This method is used by media that position themselves as independent, but from time to time they disseminate Russian propaganda. Meduza, which positions itself as an independent and reliable international Russian-language publication registered in Latvia, does not support Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and provides truthful news. However, in July 2022, analysts at the Pylyp Orlyk Institute for Democracy conducted a study of Meduza media publications for the presence of pro-Russian narratives, and they were found in 47 publications (more than 55%). The online publication disseminated messages that “Ukraine has betrayed the residents of Donbas”, “The Ukrainian army is shelling civilian targets in the occupied parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions”, “The drama theater in Mariupol was blown up from the inside”, and also repeated statements by the Russian authorities about a “preemptive strike on NATO”  and the narrative “not only Putin, but also Western politicians are to blame for the war”. Such statements were balanced with actual true news. So, consciously or unwillingly, journalists from the Latvian media help Russia justify its crimes. Consumers of the content that Meduza creates may have the feeling that “everything is not so simple” and they will not try to find a truthful version of reality.

Just like the media, some opposition Russian bloggers and politicians, whose content is consumed by Ukrainians, also pose a danger. Maksym Kats, a politician and blogger who left Russia after the start of the full-scale invasion and posts supposedly counter-propaganda videos on YouTube every day, expressed the opinion that “the Russian opposition does not owe anything to anyone, especially the Ukrainians” or “we need to share blame and responsibility. The one who shot and who gave the orders is to blame. The one who did not overthrow Putin is not to blame”. His colleague, politician and blogger Illia Varlamov, who is also watched by Ukrainians, denied Russia’s 2014 invasion of the Luhansk region and Donbas, traveled to occupied Crimea and filmed videos from the annexed peninsula, and made a film against Ukraine, where he distorted historical facts.

Bloggers in opposition to the Putin regime appeal to emotions and create the false impression that they were persecuted by the regime, they are for justice, against war and support Ukraine. For external audiences and some Ukrainians, they look like victims of global injustice, but they continue to broadcast, in measured doses, like supposedly independent media, consciously or unconsciously Russian narratives that can be picked up by content consumers.

Clichés without gist are short, commonly used phrases that are supposed to alleviate cognitive dissonance and break critical thinking. It is used to stop arguments, discussions, to move away from difficult issues, or to turn attention to other things.

American psychiatrist Robert Jay Lifton coined this term in his book Brainwashing Technology: The Psychology of Totalitarianism to describe the language used by the Chinese Communist Party as “the beginning and end of any ideological analysis”. The Chinese government used clichés without gist to prevent people from questioning the party's actions and prevent dissent or rebellion.Lifton explained that by using these phrases, interlocutors “disrupt the conversation and prevent people from thinking deeper about important issues”.

This method of propaganda was used in both the Soviet Union (which inspired George Orwell to write 1984) and modern Russia to impose conformity on people, to compress the most complex and serious problems into short, simplified and clear phrases with which to end an unpleasant conversation. During a full-scale invasion, the use of clichés is actively used by Russians who support Putin and the war against Ukraine and by Ukrainians who are influenced by Russian propaganda.

Examples:

- “We will never know the whole truth”, “everything is not so simple” - clichés used as an answer to any real fact. An example of practical application can be seen during large-scale Russian attacks on Ukrainian cities, when Russian propaganda creates opposing versions of the incident (for example, a missile attack on Chernihiv), causing cognitive dissonance. A person under the influence of propaganda and in order to avoid cognitive dissonance will not try to find a truthful version of reality.

— “Life will put everything in its place” — a response to evidence of crimes committed by Russians in Ukraine. This cliché negates any possibility of discussion, because a person does not perceive facts and arguments, and does not want to think about the problems being discussed.

- “Where have you been for eight years?”, “Kyiv regime”, “Ukrainians are Nazis” - these clichés are used to redirect attention to an inconvenient issue, that is, “turning the tables” on the fictional shortcomings of opponents.

- “This won’t change anything”, “I’m out of politics” - is used to reject a person’s participation in some matter, as if the person is insignificant and nothing depends on his or her actions. With this phrase, Russians answered the question why they did not go out to rallies after the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

— “Politicians want to quarrel us” is the answer of people who are trying to dissociate themselves, to remove collective responsibility for the actions of Russians or for missile strikes, shelling of infrastructure and the death of Ukrainians as a result of their actions.

Euphoria is a psychological state in which a person experiences elation, happiness and joy that are not justified by objective conditions. It can occur during listening to music, dancing and synchronized activities, including religious rituals, parades, and public celebrations. Russian propaganda uses states of intense emotion, including feelings of intense happiness and well-being, to manipulate public opinion and promote a particular agenda or ideology. The goal of the tactic is to create a positive emotional association with a certain phenomenon or political leader, often to sway public opinion in favor of a particular point of view. Russian propaganda uses this tactic to raise morale and greater unity of certain social groups by holding mass events, spreading fake news about the unprecedented successes of the Russian army at the front, the mass deaths of Ukrainian military personnel or the destruction of equipment.

Every year on May 9, Russia celebrates Victory Day on a grand scale - loud parades are held with the participation of military equipment, concerts with military songs, flash mobs and events like the “Immortal Regiment”, where participants walk in columns holding photographs of their relatives who participated in World War II. At the same time, Russia calls this war the “Great Patriotic War”, blurring reality and leveling the role of Ukraine and other countries in the fight against Nazism. All these measures are aimed at inducing euphoria and a sense of greatness among Russians - they say those are they who defeated Nazism, flew into space, had super-powerful nuclear potential, etc.

Russia also pompously celebrates Defender of the Fatherland Day on February 23, a legacy of the Soviet past. This day is a day off; there are solemn ceremonies near the Kremlin, parades, mass celebrations, laying flowers at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, concerts and spectacular fireworks. All this is intended to cause euphoria in people and fuel patriotism, as well as unite them into a strong social group, which thus heroizes the Russian military and encourages them to defend Russia from imaginary enemies. On February 24, 2022, Russia began a full-scale war in Ukraine. This happened the day after Defender of the Fatherland Day. As propagandists systematically spread fakes and manipulations promoting the narrative of the dangerous “Kyiv regime”, this prompted Russians, on a wave of euphoria, to take up arms with great enthusiasm and fight against the far-fetched Nazism on the territory of a foreign state.

In 2023, in the occupied cities of Luhansk and Donetsk regions, Russians also celebrated Defender of the Fatherland Day. “In the Novoaidar district, after 8 years, schools again held lessons dedicated to Defender of the Fatherland Day”, wrote in the pro-Kremlin media. Let us remind you that Russian troops occupied Novoaidar in early March 2022. In the temporarily occupied territories, Russian propaganda is trying to bring back the holidays that Ukraine canceled in order to give people a feeling of euphoria and create the illusion of joy and a happy life. They say that Russia will return both the holiday and pleasant emotions to the residents of Luhansk and Donbas.

In this context, it is worth mentioning the concerts in the Russian “Luzhnyky” on the occasion of the annexation of Crimea, which the Russians call “annexation” and “return to their native harbor”. Since 2015, March 18 is a day off in Crimea, and flash mobs and public events are held in a number of Russian cities. In particular, a large concert-meeting is being held in Moscow, at which Volodymyr Putin gives a speech and to which Russian show business stars are attracted. In 2022, the concert was called “For a world without Nazism”; its characteristic feature was the justification of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, patriotism, love for Russia and support for the Russian military. Celebrations are held every year to consolidate the positive impressions of the holiday and to ensure that the public does not cool down and systematically feels the euphoria of capturing new territories.

Euphoria paralyzes the ability to think critically, so when this state begins to pass, Russian propaganda tries to feed it with fake news about an inevitable victory over Ukraine and all Western countries or to hold another concert and mass event. Thus, Russian propagandists used the “euphoria” technique, spreading fake news that the United States welcomed Russian troops with the conquest of Bakhmut, the head of the Main Intelligence Directorate Kyryl Budanov and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Valerii Zaluzhnyi allegedly “died” - they say, the “special services” work so skillfully. This tactic is not only designed to instill joy and a sense of expected victory among the Russians and boost morale, but also to demoralize the Ukrainians.

Environmental control (Milieu control) is a tactic that involves the influence of a social group on a person so that, as a result of social pressure, he or she changes their beliefs, values and begins to act, think or behave in a certain way. The term was popularized by American psychiatrist Robert Jay Lifton. He noted that various tools, in particular specialized language and slang, can be used to isolate members from the rest of society and deepen connections with a group of people.

Russian propagandists widely use environmental control tactics in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine. The occupiers are trying to isolate local residents of the occupied regions by limiting access to the Internet, Ukrainian media and television, mobile communications, and in some cases, even turning off Russian communications and the Internet. Almost the only source of information remains Russian television, which broadcasts Kremlin narratives around the clock, and the group of people who find themselves in the occupied city also do not have access to information externally.

For example, after the liberation of Kupiansk by Ukrainian troops, a group of people from other temporarily occupied cities picked up Russian disinformation that the Ukrainian Armed Forces allegedly drove over Russian teachers in tanks, whom the occupiers brought from Russia to brainwash Ukrainian children. Such messages were distributed in local telegram channels, rumors were transmitted orally and repeated many times. And since the search for alternative sources of information in the temporarily occupied territories is impossible or requires significant effort, people were subjected to social pressure (after all, this is what the social group thinks, and the information was repeated by several sources, which created the effect of objectivity) and began to believe in fakes. Therefore, some people might have fear that when the Ukrainian army comes to de-occupy their city, it will commit the same crimes.

As for the use of a common language that helps identify members of a social group, Russian propaganda uses newspeak - inventing new words and phrases, redefining existing terms. The Russians launch missile attacks on civilian infrastructure, residential buildings, hospitals, schools and kindergartens, but broadcast that they are targeting “decision-making centers” - supposedly the location of the Ukrainian military. Hiding behind this term, Russia is trying to normalize the shelling of Ukrainian territory (even if these are military targets) and hide the murder of Ukrainian civilians. By picking up the newspeak, residents of the temporarily occupied territories not only identify their own kind, but are also influenced by Russian narratives. They begin to think that Russia is only hitting the “decision-making center” and is not doing anything wrong. The use of a newspeak unites these people into a certain social group, which then puts pressure, in conditions of information isolation, on Ukrainians who have the opposite opinion.

Russian propaganda uses the tactics of opposite versions - it presents mutually exclusive explanations for a certain event or phenomenon. The use of this tactic causes cognitive dissonance. Cognitive dissonance is an internal conflict that arises as a result of a collision in the human mind of incompatible judgments, ideas, beliefs that negate each other. Russian propaganda deliberately spreads versions that deny each other in order to make people feel confused, insecure and impose the impression that “not everything is so simple”, but “we will never know the whole truth”. A person in whose mind a cognitive dissonance has arisen is unlikely to try to find a true version of reality. This is what Russian propaganda is counting on.

After the Russian military blew up the Kakhovka HPP on June 6, 2023, propagandists promoted conflicting messages: that the dam collapsed on its own due to improper maintenance; the dam crumbled as a result of shelling by the Ukrainian military; only the upper part of the Kakhovka hydroelectric power station was destroyed, and the dam was not damaged: the “Kyiv regime” committed “undermining the structures of the Kakhovka hydroelectric power station”.

Messages with mutually exclusive versions appeared about the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Valerii Zaluzhnyi. In May and June 2023, Russian propaganda wrote that Zaluzhnyi allegedly “died”; he was allegedly removed from the public space because he “did not deserve Zelenskyi's trust”; he was seriously injured and underwent surgery; he actually went abroad.

Russian propaganda spread similar versions about the head of the Main Intelligence Directorate, Kyryl Budanov: he allegedly “died” from a missile strike; is in a Berlin hospital after a Russian missile “hit” the office next to his; after a Russian missile attack, he is in a coma, although this is “hidden”.

Russian propaganda provides information in a way that confuses the person and creates contradictions that will create anxiety, guilt, and pressure that they want to get rid of. Since propagandists spread many versions of the same event, it is difficult for a person to determine which one is true.

When previous representations do not agree with new information, it causes discomfort. There are several ways to overcome discomfort and get rid of cognitive dissonance: change one’s own beliefs and correct behavior; justify one's own beliefs by discounting the phenomenon that causes cognitive dissonance, or by avoiding information that may cause it.

Russians try to get rid of cognitive dissonance through the slightest resistance - not to change their minds, but to justify their beliefs so that they seem logical. To do this, they search the Russian media and social networks among friends with similar views for information, for example, that Nazism reigns in Ukraine. Using cognitive dissonance, propagandists try to arouse doubts and paranoia in people, so that they can later use this state of confusion to their advantage - to encourage them to be inactive or, on the contrary, to take specific actions that are beneficial to Russian propaganda, for example, to mobilize into the Russian army and commit genocide against the Ukrainian people.

This tactic is to ignore the topic of discussion when it changes to the opposite. Ignoring the topic is used by Russian propagandists. After an event occurs that is unfavorable to Russian propaganda, official sources keep silent about it or selectively cover certain aspects. This tactic is used to reduce or minimize the negative aspects of a situation, divert attention from important issues, and create a false narrative. Propagandists hide information, sharing only news that supports their false thesis, while ignoring or blocking the content that hangs them. This contributes to the echo chamber effect.

Even under the Soviet Union, Russian propaganda used the tactic of ignoring the topic. For most Russians, the Second World War is called the “Great Patriotic War” and it allegedly began on June 22, 1941 with the attack of Nazi Germany troops on Poland. However, the fact is hushed up that the Nazi troops invaded Poland on September 1, 1939, and the Soviet Union itself occupied Poland on September 17, 1939. Prior to this, Nazi Germany occupied the territories of the Czech Republic and Austria, and the Soviet Union did not call it an aggressor.

During the Soviet period, ignoring the topic was actively used by the then press. The Chornobyl tragedy, which occurred as a result of the explosion at the fourth power unit of the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant on April 26, 1986, was kept silent by the Soviet media for several days. Only on April 28 at 21:00 did the Vriemia (Time) television program very succinctly report on the accident, which was supposed to create the illusion of safety for people, and events for the May 1 holiday were also not canceled. They tried to hush up the greatest man-made disaster in the history of mankind: the real diagnoses of people who received radiation damage were hidden. However, due to the scale of the disaster, which affected a number of European countries and foreign media, it could not be ignored. Soviet traditions and ignoring the topic were inherited by modern Russia, which on February 24, 2022 started a war against Ukraine. In May 2023, Russian propagandists disseminated information about the serious injury of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Valerii Zaluzhnyi, due to which he would no longer be able to perform his duties. Murdered versions even appeared on anonymous telegram channels and in media broadcasting pro-Kremlin rhetoric. However, already on May 25, Colonel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, blogger and journalist Anatolii Stefan “Stirlitz” published a video with Valerii Zaluzhnyi, and from that moment all the pro-Kremlin media and telegram channels took it in their mouths: no one denied the information about the death of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, but the fact of his public appearance was ignored.

Another topic Russian propaganda ignores is strikes on Russian cities. On July 30, 2023, there was a drone attack on Moscow, which resulted in the destruction of the facades of two Moscow City towers, where Russian ministries are located - the Ministry of Economic Development, the Ministry of Industry and Trade, and the Ministry of Telecom and Mass Communications. In connection with this event, the air zone over Moscow was closed for flights. However, Russian federal television channels ignored this incident and focused on covering the Navy parade in St. Petersburg and a conversation with Putin’s journalists following the Russia-Africa summit.

Intentionally or unintentionally, by ignoring important information, Russian propaganda prevents the spread of unwanted news among the population. By taking technical measures, Russian propagandists manage to prevent their popularization and prevent the emergence of an undesirable negative reaction among citizens.

Humor and political satire have become increasingly important in propaganda over time. They become strong, complex and multifaceted elements of the psychological impact on people. With a less serious form, jokes can effectively convey important, often controversial, and even offensive information. Often, it is with the use of elements of satire that certain information acquires the properties of a “viral” one and spreads much faster.

However, the addition of humor creates meaningful constructs that leave room for maneuver during the discussion, especially when regular language and serious arguments do not work. It sort of “turns off” critical thinking in people. In addition, the understanding and perception of jokes creates the conditions for the formation of certain social communities. And humor in this sense plays the role of a kind of marker of belonging to these groups, the recognition system “friend / foe”. Also, humor can really informationally “kill” a certain person, group of people or country. It is able to form a dismissive attitude and reduce serious things to the level of causing only laughter.

One of the first genres of political humor was caricature, which began to develop in the first half of the 18th century. In the Soviet Union, it was turned into a powerful weapon of its own propaganda even at the beginning of its existence - in the 1920s. Borys Yefimov, the Kukryniksy (Mykhailo Kupriyanov, Porfirii Krylov and Mykola Sokolov), Dmytro Moor (Orlov), Viktor Deni (Denisov) and Mykhailo Cheremnykh are considered outstanding masters of propaganda cartoons in the USSR. Their works ridiculed both the external enemies of the USSR, such as Nazi Germany, fascist Italy, Western states (USA, Great Britain, France, etc.), as well as sections of the population within the country that the Soviet regime considered hostile to itself: nobles, capitalists, kulaks, peasants ), priests, etc. The Pravda newspaper had a whole satirical magazine Krokodyl (Crocodile), which was an integral part of Russian propaganda and published most of the authors mentioned above.

With the progress of information technology, propaganda with the help of humor only intensifies and develops already in modern Putin's Russia. Perhaps the most famous propagandist from humor was the deceased Mykhailo Zadornov. Many of us remember his anti-Western narratives about supposedly “stupid Americans” that were his hallmark as a comedian. After the Revolution of Dignity in 2014 and until his death in 2017, Zadornov repeatedly used anti-Ukrainian jokes. He did not even hesitate to joke about the downing of a Malaysian Boeing by Russian terrorists in 2014 in the Donetsk region.

Another source of Russian humorous propaganda is the KVN program. The show is a powerful tool for strategic political communications through access to various distribution channels. The program is broadcast in prime time on federal and international Russian TV channels, distributed on social networks, on the website, jokes are reprinted in the press and broadcast on the radio. The founder of KVN, Oleksandr Masliakov, has close ties to the Kremlin. This is evidenced, in particular, by the state financing of the construction of the Planet KVN concert hall in Moscow, support for KVN competitions abroad, participation of top levels (including Putin and Medvediev) in filming programs. In addition, on June 1, 2016, the Gazprommedia holding launched a separate KVN television channel with an almost round-the-clock broadcast of this show. Masliakov also received the state award “For Merit to the Fatherland” of the third degree. Of course, the authors of KVN do not forget to thank their sponsors for their generosity - the show constantly shows a positive image of President Putin and his team. Such friendship with politicians allowed the owner of KVN Oleksandr Masliakov to create not only his own program, but also a large business empire to support it.

Other well-known Russian comedians also support Putin and are the mouthpieces of his propaganda. Among them are Mykhailo Halustian, Yevhenii Petrosian (Ukraine imposed personal sanctions against them), Harik Kharlamov, Yurii Stoianov, Ivan Urgant, Volodymyr Vinokur, Volodymyr Moiseienko and Volodymyr Danilets (the last two are known as the creative duet “Rabbits”).

Telegram is a Russian multi-platform messenger that also provides optional end-to-end encrypted chats (better known as “secret chats”) and video calls, VoIP, file sharing, and some others. Its author is the co-founder of the social network Vkontakte, Russian IT specialist and businessman Pavel Durov. The service is based on the MTProto correspondence encryption technology developed by his brother Mykola. Telegram shows stable growth in the number of users around the world. On June 20, 2022 the company announced the achievement of a figure in 700 million users.

Anonymous telegram channels first appeared in Russia in the second half of 2016. Their appearance and growth was facilitated, in fact, by the complete destruction of independent media in the country and censorship by the Putin regime. At the beginning of its existence, anonymous telegrams were used more in Russian domestic political conflicts than for pro-government propaganda. Due to the monopolization of power in the Russian Federation by the United Russia party, representatives of the Russian establishment have very limited opportunities for mutual public criticism. In mid-2018, anonymous telegrams began to rapidly gain popularity in Russia and were used for Kremlin propaganda. Initially, subscribers were cheated at the expense of false users - “bots”.

At the end of 2018 - beginning of 2019, new and a sharp increase in existing anonymous telegram channels aimed at Ukrainian readers took place. These channels, both engaged in covert Russian propaganda, masquerading as pro-Ukrainian ones, were also used in the internal political struggle among Ukrainian politicians. At the beginning of 2021, the SBU exposed a network of Russian intelligence agencies spreading enemy propaganda through a number of telegram channels. These were both pseudo-pro-Ukrainian channels engaged in covert propaganda, as well as openly pro-Russian ones, oriented mainly to the south and east of Ukraine. Among the “pseudo-pro-Ukrainian” channels, such large and well-known ones as Lehitymnyi (Legitimacy), Resident, Cartel, Splietnitsa (Gossip Girl), etc. should be singled out. Russian propaganda channels for certain regions of Ukraine are represented by such ones as Odessa fraer, Trempel Kharkov, Dnepr live, Atypical Zaporozhie and others. The Russians expected to seize more territories than they managed, so they created separate channels for the largest cities of Ukraine, which were supposed to operate under the conditions of occupation and justify it. When the occupation did not take place, these Telegram channels did not close, but are still active, spreading manipulations, fakes and disinformation to undermine the credibility of the central and local authorities. Also, Russian propaganda in early 2022 created a new network of telegram channels intended for the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine.

Pseudo-pro-Ukrainian channels present information, at first glance, supposedly in the interests of Ukraine. They can call Ukrainians “ours”, and Russia an enemy, and even harshly criticize its government. But the Ukrainian authorities are always positioned as inefficient, corrupt and dependent on the West, or even worse than Russian ones. Anti-Western narratives are also promoted to discredit our allies in the eyes of Ukrainians. Anonymous telegram channels are distinguished by “convincing” storytelling and original text style, emphasizing that information from the highest echelons of power is “closed” to the average reader, which everyone probably wants to own; that only they, an anonymous telegram channel, tell the people the truth, while traditional media lie. If you see the words “source” and “insider” in an anonymous telegram channel, it is most likely disinformation.

Some Ukrainians still trust these telegram channels, despite all the efforts of organizations and media that counteract disinformation, and there are several reasons for this. First, the global trend of declining trust in traditional media and centralized formats for presenting information. Trust in bloggers, opinion leaders (so-called LSD) and anonymous information channels is growing. Secondly, before the war, most of the Ukrainian media belonged to the oligarchs and broadcast messages that were beneficial for them. Thirdly, it is the low level of media literacy and critical thinking of some journalists and editors. Links to anonymous telegram channels legitimize the disinformation posted there and make fact-checking more difficult. These channels may also contain misinformation (false information without the intent to harm), however, it can also have dangerous consequences: for example, causing panic in society.

Propagandists are constantly trying to justify Russia's actions in various ways, using and fueling the theories and concepts created by right-wing radical movements.

We have already written about the “world Jewish conspiracy” theory and other anti-Semitic conspiracy theories. The theory of “cultural Marxism” is no exception, as it depicts Marxism and its “creators” as the main threat to the world. In particular, its fans believe that in the twentieth century, a number of Jewish intellectuals allegedly conspired to destroy “Western culture and traditions”. Like, LGBTQI +, feminism, multiculturalism and other progressive phenomena are really promoted as part of the process of “destruction” and are artificially planted all over the world.

This theory is an example of how conspiracy theories can harm society and cause tragedies. She inspired the Oslo attacks in 2011, when Anders Breivik planted explosives in the government quarter of the capital and shot young people who participated in a youth camp on the island of Utoya. To explain his own intentions before committing the attacks, Breivik published his manifesto for the “liberation of Europe”, in particular, from “cultural Marxism”, where he quoted books from the 1990s that spread the theory. Breivik's attacks were tried to be repeated in a number of countries around the world, in particular in Poland and the Czech Republic, and the terrorist who fired at mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand, called himself a follower of Breivik’s ideas. Now, however, right-wing radical figures in the US and Europe are constantly using the “bulk of cultural Marxism” in their public speeches.

Mentions of the theory can also be found in Russian anonymous telegram channels, especially among “military correspondents”. They justify Russia's aggression against Ukraine by fighting Western values, generalizing them with the term of cultural Marxism. Like, in Ukraine they are deliberately instilling a policy of multiculturalism and tolerance, which contradicts “traditional values”. Russian propaganda does not hesitate to use the statements of right-wing radical figures on this topic, fueling anti-Ukrainian rhetoric. Despite the fact that it positions itself as the legal successor of the USSR and announces a course towards “denazification”, in this way Russia is simultaneously struggling with leftist ideology and “manifestations of Marxism”. By resorting to spreading the ideas of this theory, Russia once again confirms its imperial ambitions and neglect of the Ukrainian people.

“Foot in the door” is a psychological technique that shows the pattern between a person first fulfilling a minor request, and then being forced to fulfill other, more burdensome requests. The use of this phenomenon for practical purposes is often called the “foot in the door” method, another name for it is the method of gradual amplification of requests.

The foot in the door technique shows a tendency where a person first agrees to give someone a small favor or help, but one step leads to the next, and they become involved in a case that is sometimes completely unnecessary to him. Sometimes such a “mini-service” requires much more time, energy, effort from a person and may even contradict their convictions (conscience, common sense, saving money). An interesting fact here is that a person would probably never agree to burdensome or contradictory requests if they had not fulfilled the first, seemingly completely insignificant. This phenomenon is used in marketing, trade, the service sector, management, internal political struggles, as well as in propaganda.

The psychological technique “foot in the door” requires compliance with the following rules:

• start with appeals, requests that, at first glance, do not oblige to anything, are not burdensome for the person involved in the interaction;

• create a favorable emotional background for people's interaction. Communication (even a single one) should evoke emotions in a person, form a tendency to repeat contact. The person involved must feel the participation on the part of the other person, the satisfaction from his or her insignificant act or the solemnity of the moment;

• it is important that the person involved in the interaction does not have the feeling that he or she is being pressured or forced to do something. In this case, the effect will be minimal, because a person is not inclined to consider actions performed under pressure as a manifestation of his or her own convictions.

The Russian state propaganda machine uses this tactic against large masses of people. As an example, we can mention the increase in the level of Russia's territorial claims to Ukraine since 2014. If at first the Russians allegedly demanded only the recognition of the illegally occupied Crimea, then further propaganda began a discourse on the recognition of the so-called DNR and LNR as independent republics (at first within the actual demarcation line of 2015, and then within the full borders of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions). In 2022, the demands of the Russians have become tougher: we are talking about the alleged full-fledged inclusion of Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions into Russia, even though Russia has never controlled parts of the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia regions.

The Russians are also trading in the case of a possible extension of the grain deal. Their primary requirement was the launch and stable operation of the Togliatti-Odesa ammonia pipeline passing through the territory of Ukraine. After it was damaged in the fighting, the requirement lost its meaning. So the Russian authorities and propaganda started talking about another demand, this time to Western countries: the connection to the SWIFT global payment system of Rossilhosbank, a financial institution through which international trade in Russian grain takes place.

In addition, the aggressor state uses this tactic in sports. Since at international tournaments in most sports the Russians are suspended due to the war unleashed by their government, they are trying to remove the suspension with the help of gradual concessions: first, they are speaking in a neutral status without a flag and an anthem with an obligation to sign a declaration condemning the war, and then the Russian propaganda machine begins to gradually oppose these restrictions, up to the complete restoration of the rights of athletes, noting that allegedly “sport is out of politics” and complaining about the worldwide “russophobia”.

Russian propagandists constantly and systematically use the topic of corruption in Ukraine. News about the “most corrupt state of Ukraine”, which will destroy itself, was in the Russian media ten, five or two years ago. That is, the topic of corruption in Ukraine is one of the most common narratives of Russian propaganda. Russia uses corruption scandals in Ukraine to discredit it. In particular, Russian propaganda assures that corruption is the ideology of the Ukrainian people. It seems that corruption permeates Ukrainian society: from education, medicine, services, sports to the level of law enforcement officers, courts, municipal and central authorities.

Russian propagandists argue that if Ukraine still somehow struggled with corruption, into which it slipped after the collapse of the Soviet Union, at the beginning of the 2000s, then after the Euromaidan it is gone. According to propaganda, after 2014 Ukraine has slid to the level of Latin American states that are under the destructive influence of kleptocracy. After 2014, a number of anti-corruption agencies appeared in Ukraine, and propaganda sources were skeptical about this trend and decided that Ukrainians were monkeying with the American model, even a foreigner was appointed deputy head of NABU. Propagandists often cited then U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt, who suggested that corruption is sometimes worse than Russian tanks. They also speculated on the words of the then Vice President Joe Biden, who called corruption in Ukraine a cancer. It seems that corruption sits too deep in the liver of the West. It seems like a few more things will happen and it will stop supporting Ukraine.

The constant focus on the corruption of the authorities causes society, on the one hand, to distrust the leadership of the state and state institutions, and on the other hand, to the effectiveness of the fight against corruption on the way to membership in the EU and NATO. Russian propaganda here works at the same time for the domestic consumer: it demonstrates the absurdity of Ukraine, which the West is about to “throw”. Like, one sees what the game of democracy and European integration leads to. Russian propaganda also promotes messages to the Ukrainian audience, trying to affirm the opinion that the system of power in Ukraine is so rotten that nothing can change it; the state has no future, let alone the prospects for membership in the EU or NATO.

Russian propaganda systematically speculates on anti-corruption investigations by Ukrainian journalists and public figures into alleged corruption in the Ministry of Defense. The most famous case was the possible overpricing of food purchases, including chicken eggs. Recently, propagandists have been hyping the topic of non-critical spending of the state and local budgets during the war. They are trying to add a corruption component to these costs, even where it does not exist.

However, when writing about corruption in Ukraine and the fact that our state seems to have no chance for the future because of this, Russian propaganda avoids mentioning corruption in Russia. For example, from January to July 2021, 24.5 thousand cases of corruption were recorded in Russia. In 2017, the head of the Russian Accounts Chamber, Oleksii Kudrin, said that the department had identified a violation of 1.865 trillion rubles. That is, there is also corruption in Russia, moreover, there is also a fight against it. For example, opposition leader Oleksii Navalnyi “stepped on the Kremlin's toes” by making a series of high-profile revelations of large-scale corruption acts of officials, for which he was imprisoned. Also, Russian propaganda avoids mentioning that even in the conditions of a full-scale war, Ukraine is trying to fight corruption.

One of the necessary conditions for the existence of any totalitarian or authoritarian regime is the education of citizens in the spirit of devotion to power, the ruling regime and ideology. With adults, this is sometimes quite difficult to do, because they have their own well-established principles, attitudes and life experiences that may contradict what a non-democratic regime needs. Also, at least some adults have critical thinking, which further complicates the task for propagandists.

So the ideal option in this regard for such regimes is the education of “correct” citizens “from scratch”, that is, from childhood. That is why animation has become a powerful weapon of Soviet propaganda since the 1920s.

The beginning of propaganda cartoons in the USSR was laid by such films as “Soviet Toys” in 1924 and “China on Fire” in 1925. The first animated film ridiculed the “bourgeois way of life” and the gluttony of the so-called “Nepmen” - Soviet entrepreneurs of that period. In the second, support for the revolution in China was expressed and the alleged interference of Western states in its internal affairs was condemned. After that, the animation was firmly entrenched among the main means of Soviet propaganda.

As with many other propaganda tactics and methods, modern Russian propaganda follows its Soviet predecessors in the field of animation as well. Back in 2018, opposition Russian journalist Arkadii Babchenko explained in detail why the Russian animated series Masha and the Bear is propaganda and dangerous for the psyche of Ukrainian children. The cartoon is promoting Soviet symbols and Russian militarism, imposing unhealthy behavior patterns on children (hysteria, unwillingness and inability to conduct a dialogue, radical stubbornness and self-righteousness, etc.). All these features are inherent in the propagandists and ordinary sympathizers of the Putin regime.

Another example of Russian propaganda in cartoons is the Three Bogatyrs (Heroes) series. In it, Kyiv Rus appears as an integral part of the “Russian world” with a large number of Russian symbols, authoritarian power is popularized (and, of course, Prince Volodymyr is the ruler, although there were many princes in the history of Kyiv Rus). Bogatyrs are blind executors of the will of the prince and completely obey all his whims, even if his ideas and actions look absurd. Everything Russian in the animated series is extolled, and everything Western and European is portrayed as evil. So, Baba Yaga dreams of living like in Europe, but the “valiant heroes” drive her out of Kyiv.

The most recent and well-known example of propaganda in animation is the Tale of Vania and Mykola, released in 2022, after the start of a full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. This is direct propaganda: children are explained in a language they can understand why Russia attacked Ukraine, thus justifying the aggression, killings of civilians and massive war crimes of the occupiers. The cartoon uses an old Russian narrative that supposedly Ukraine “bombed Donbas and killed its children for 8 years”, and Russia only “defends its compatriots”.

A “cult of personality” occurs when a person uses the mass media to create an idealized and heroic public image, often through undeniable flattery and praise. Usually these are the authorities in authoritarian and totalitarian states and religious leaders. To form a cult of their own personality and propagate their ideas, they use such methods as censorship and oppression of freedom of speech, playing with symbols, rewriting history, creating the idea that only one person controls the state, etc.

As one example of the personality cult and its use in state propaganda, one can mention the King of France, Louis XIV, who ruled in the 17th-18th centuries. It was this ruler who called himself the “Sun King”, and he is also credited with the famous phrase “The state is me”. He concentrated extraordinary power in his hands and is considered one of the founders of the absolute monarchy as a form of government. Despite the fact that Napoleon Bonaparte was an army general of Revolutionary France and, in fact, a political opponent of the Bourbon dynasty and absolute monarchy, in 1804 he proclaimed himself Emperor of France and established his own cult of personality, although he was very different in entourage, he was analogue of the image of Louis XIV.

The 20th century gave the world such mass murderers and war criminals as Adolf Hitler, Volodymyr Lenin, Benito Mussolini and Joseph Stalin. They all had their own personality cults and powerful propaganda systems that justified the atrocities. Moreover, the cult of Lenin was perhaps most developed during the reign of Stalin, who thus wanted to exalt himself as if he were the closest ally and follower of Lenin, although this was not true.

Modern Russian propaganda does not lag behind Soviet predecessors. So, the British edition of BBC News back in 2001 wrote about the beginning of the development of the personality cult of Volodymyr Putin. Only a year had passed since Putin was officially elected to office and two years had passed since the beginning of his actual reign. The personality cult of the President of Russia developed rapidly due to the fact that the collapse of the USSR and the partial loss of imperial greatness became a tangible psychological blow to Russian society. The 90s of the XX century became a difficult test for the Russians: the economic crisis, the rise of corruption, the inability of law enforcement agencies to cope with rampant crime, and the army with the freedom fighters of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. The late ex-president Borys Yeltsyn had the image of a relative democrat and could not overcome these problems. He often got into comical situations related to alcohol abuse, which did not give Russia as a whole respect in the international arena, but personally - within Russia.

Against the background of the old and sick Yeltsyn, Putin had many competitive advantages: young, intelligent, educated, with a strong character, an athlete, a native of law enforcement agencies. Such a person ideally met the needs of the then Russian society. This allowed him to gradually clean up the political space in Russia, become a dictator and establish a totalitarian regime in the country.

The fact that Putin’s personality cult is only growing and strengthening is eloquently evidenced by the conflict that arose in the Russian authorities in 2023 with a potential new leader, whose authority in Russia “grew up” in the bloody war against Ukraine – Yevhenii Pryhozhyn, who was defeated during his rebellion. Moreover, Putin could not even tolerate such a nonentity who does not pose any threat to him, like the ex-leader of the terrorists of the so-called DNR Ihor Hirkin (Strielkov), who was imprisoned.

Appeal to the people, or argumentum ad populum, is a propaganda tactic based on a logical flaw. It consists in the fact that a certain statement or idea is considered correct because it is considered as such by all or most people. And most people do not seem to be wrong. Propagandists often use this method when the process of gathering evidence and constructing rational arguments to support their position is too long or costly.

This argument can be misleading for two reasons:

a) The person who puts it forward does not always have complete, exhaustive and reliable data on the “majority”. Speaking of the “majority”, a person usually relies on his personal experience and the experience of their acquaintances, often representing a very limited socio-economic profile, unacceptable from the point of view of statistics;

b) The generally accepted opinion on this issue may be erroneous. For example, in Ancient Greece, the vast majority of its inhabitants believed that the Sun revolved around the Earth, but this does not mean that it really is.

 Russian propaganda does not always give a logical argument and tactics of “appeal to the people” to this example. Yes, anonymous pro-Russian telegram channels regularly publish videos where Ukrainians are dissatisfied with something, and transfer the opinion of one or several people to the whole nation in the lead-in to them. This may relate to the provision of the army, treatment and social guarantees for veterans, mobilization, tax and price increases, corruption of officials, arbitrariness of law enforcement agencies and other sensitive topics during martial law. We should also mention one of the most vivid images of Russian propaganda of the beginning of a full-scale invasion of Ukraine - “grandmother with a red flag”. The purpose of this myth is to show that allegedly the inhabitants of Ukraine support and rejoice at the Russian occupation. In fact, the Ukrainian pensioner Anna Ivanivna came out with a Soviet flag to, as she thought, the Russian military, in order to convince them “not to smash Ukraine”.

Russian President Volodymyr Putin said in February 2023 that the majority of Russians supported the war against Ukraine (the so-called special military operation). This statement has no grounds, because it is impossible to conduct impartial sociological studies of this issue in a totalitarian society. Here Putin appeals to the Russian people, trying to keep their favor and support.

This propaganda tactic is based on the constant and systematic belief of the target audience that the side represented by the propagandists will certainly win and achieve their goals. This may happen soon or sometime in the future, but it seems to happen for sure. In this way, people affected by this manipulation are persuaded not to “be late” and join the ranks of the winners while there is still such an opportunity. Along with this tactic, another similar tactic is almost always used - “multiple repetition”.

Russian propaganda used this tactic as early as World War II. Everyone is well aware of the phrase “our cause is righteous, the enemy will be defeated, victory will be ours”. It was said in a slightly modified format by the then Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Viacheslav Molotov on June 22, 1941, the day the Nazi troops invaded the USSR. Further, Soviet propaganda very often used it as a mantra in order to raise the morale of the army and the civilian population. Throughout the war, the “chief announcer of the USSR” Yurii Levitan ended with this slogan each of his radio messages to the population of the USSR with important news from the front.

Modern Russian propaganda also systematically uses this tactic. Back in 2014, Russian President Volodymyr Putin threatened the EU leadership that he would take Kyiv in two weeks. At the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, propagandists shouted with one voice that the Russian army would “capture Kyiv in three days”. But the situation turned out quite differently, and thanks to the Ukrainian Defense Forces, this phrase has become a meme and a tool of ridicule from the occupying army and Russian propaganda.

After that, Russian propaganda changed the approach to using this tactic. Now they note that Ukraine is allegedly losing the “war of attrition” in the long run due to the fact that the Western allies are tired of the war and seem to be about to significantly reduce the size and volume of both military and financial assistance to Ukraine. Russian propaganda places great hopes on a possible change of power in the United States, the victory of the Republican candidate in the presidential election, ideally Donald Trump, known for his populist rhetoric.

The tactic of “expanding the range of acceptable” is used in cases where the propaganda message is unacceptable to the target audience. It is used when most persuasion techniques can backfire: the audience will perceive the message even worse.

There are two ways to expand the boundaries of perception. First, it is possible to take a more extreme position, which will force the audience to accept, without resistance, more moderate positions, which they would not approve of if the propagandists “upped the stakes”. Second, put forward more modest demands, and then gradually bring the audience to the acceptance of the desired position.

This tactic is based on the sociological concept of the Overton Window. According to Overton's model, at each moment in time, certain ideas constitute the current norm in society, forming a reference point. The rest of the ideas may or may not be within the acceptable range. The boundaries of the window of neutral political discourse are ideas that fall into the category of acceptable. Acceptable statements can be considered politically safe to be voiced in public or by politicians who care about their image and continue their political career. Supporting ideas outside the window, Overton himself considered it risky and potentially harmful to a political career.

The tactic of expanding the range of acceptable was used by propaganda in Nazi Germany. After Hitler came to power in a relatively democratic way, they, along with Goebbels, increased hatred and xenophobia in the politically divided German society of the Weimar Republic. The Nazis did this to maintain their power and consolidate supporters against the “common enemy”. And the enemy changed at different stages of the consolidation of power by the Nazis. At first, their own National Socialists fell under repression. The destruction of the leadership of the SA assault squads became known as the “Night of the Long Knives”. Then the political opponents of the Nazis became victims of repression: communists, socialists and social democrats. Then the turn came to various social and national groups in Germany: representatives of the LGBT community, freemasons, Jews, Roma, Aphronim, people with disabilities and mental disorders, Jehovah's Witnesses, etc. As a result, German society accepted the beginning of the Second World War, the “death factories” and the extermination of millions of people without significant resistance. It took several decades to prepare to take the brutality for granted.

The Russians also use the tactics of “expanding the range of acceptable” and approving military aggression against other states. Various odious statements that Putin cannot broadcast directly in order to maintain respectability as head of state are broadcast by other Russian politicians, such as the late Volodymyr Zhyrynovskyi, as well as former head of Roscosmos Dmytro Rohozin and Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council Dmytro  Medvediev. Not far behind them are the so-called ideologists such as Oleksandr Duhin and Timofii Serheitsev, who have repeatedly called for the destruction and partition of Ukraine and the murder of Ukrainians. Thus, all of them are gradually morally preparing Russian society and the international community for the worst scenarios.

Ukraine also uses the tactics of “expanding the range of acceptable” when lobbying for an increase in military assistance from allies. Our diplomats gradually got the allies to agree to supply Ukraine with modern artillery and air defense systems, tanks and cluster munitions while in the first months after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Western societies and politicians were not ready to provide Ukraine with any of this.

In Ukraine, this tactic is also used on controversial internal political issues. Through constant communication, medical and electoral reforms, the opening of the land market, the legalization of medical cannabis and the legalization of civil partnerships for LGBT couples became possible in Ukraine. Advocacy and further implementation of these reforms was carried out gradually due to significant resistance within Ukraine, but changes were no longer perceived as impossible.

“Brilliant generalizations” is a manipulative tactic that consists in attributing positive characteristics to the phenomena or events that propagandists talk about. At the same time, the details of phenomena or events that contradict the vision of the propagandists are declared “not peculiar” to what is being discussed, “insignificant” or “invented by enemies”.

Tactics is based on the exploitation of people's positive attitude towards such concepts as freedom, democracy, patriotism, peace, happiness, love, truth, order, etc. Propagandists adapt these concepts to justify decisions, points of view and actions that are beneficial to them.

For example, four weeks after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, a concert and flash mobs were held in Russia in honor of the 8th anniversary of the illegal annexation of Crimea. The concert was held under the slogan “For (Za) a world without Nazism”, and the flash mob was “For (Za) the world, for (Za) Russia, for (Za) the President”. With slogans about peace, unity in the fight against the “Nazis” and support for the authorities, the organizers of the event tried to divert attention from the fact that “the special operation, which was supposed to end in three days”, dragged on for weeks.

The Putin regime equated the concept of “patriotism” with the support of the authorities. Only people who support Putin and the aggressive war he unleashed in Ukraine can now be considered real patriots of Russia. So, many Russian athletes who publicly support the dictator justify this with “patriotism”.

Also, the soldiers of the occupying army who commit war crimes in Ukraine are called by the Russian propaganda media “new heroes of Russia” who are “ready to give their lives for the sake of victory over Nazism and for the sake of world peace”.

We have already talked about the opposite of “brilliant generalizations” propaganda tactics. It is called “labeling” and is used to highlight the negative aspects of what propagandists are talking about.

“Scarecrow” is a propaganda tactic in which the arguments of opponents are replaced by weaker ones. After that, it is they who are refuted, and not the primary, stronger positions. This tactic exploits a logical flaw called “thesis substitution”.

A classic example of this tactic being used is this dialogue:

A: “Sunny days are good.”

B: “If all days were sunny, there would never be rain, and without rain there would be drought and starvation”.

In this case, B replaces A's statement with the fact that supposedly only sunny days are good and refutes it. In fact, A says that sunny days are good, without mentioning anything about rainy days.

Although the “scarecrow” is considered a rather primitive manipulative technique, it is often used both in domestic political battles and in international propaganda. For example, opponents of the legalization of medical cannabis in Ukraine, which has an exclusively analgesic effect for the seriously ill and wounded, say that Ukraine will become “one of the leading drug hubs in the world” and “a second Afghanistan”, etc. Against the legalization of civil partnerships, including for same-sex couples, there are arguments like “I don’t want my son to become gay” or “the church and God are against it”. Or, for example, reproaches about the adoption of children by same-sex couples, although the profile bill does not provide for this.

Russian propaganda also constantly uses this manipulative technique. So, in the assertion that Ukrainians are a nation separate from Russians with their own language, history and culture, there are answers like “the Black Sea was dug up by ancient ukry (Ukrainians)”  or “and Jesus Christ was Ukrainian”, etc.

If someone dares to criticize the “cult of Victory” in Russia, they are accused of supporting Nazism. If someone demands democratic freedoms and rights, they are accused of inciting unrest and destroying order in the country. Under the dictation of the West, of course. When Ukrainians accuse Russia of illegally annexing territories and a war with many victims, they are answered that “you have Nazis in power who illegally overthrew the legitimate Yanukovych” or “and who bombed the Donbas and killed children for 8 years?”. This is how substitution, monkeying and depreciation of strong and rational arguments with outright nonsense occurs.

The propaganda tactic of “whataboutism” involves responding to criticism or asking a question in the format “What about ...?”. That is, “transfer of arrows” to the shortcomings of opponents. A hint that they have no moral right to criticize, because they themselves have the same or even more serious problems, and do not adhere to the principles that they publicly declare. It is based on the logical flaw “Te quoque” (“you are the same” or “look at yourself”).

Despite the English name, this tactic, like many other methods of propaganda and disinformation, was popularized by the Russians. Back around the 1880s, when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Empire thus defended itself from moral condemnations from the United States. But whataboutism was most widespread in the 1970s and 1980s during the apogee of the Cold War.

For example, after the Chornobyl disaster, the Soviet state news agency TASS wrote reports about accidents at nuclear facilities in the United States, such as the Three Mile Island and Jinnah nuclear power plants. Soviet propagandists claimed that the American anti-nuclear group recorded 2300 accidents and other malfunctions in 1979. In the USSR, there was even an anecdote that very well reveals the essence of this tactic:

- What is the salary of a Soviet engineer?

- But you [the racist name for African Americans] get lynched!

Indeed, acts of violence against African Americans during the US Civil Rights Movement of 1955-1968 became one of the key messages of Soviet propaganda whataboutism.

Like many other “beautiful treasures of the Soviet past”, modern Russian propagandists and officials systematically use this tactic.

Russian political viewer Abbas Galliamov, who is in opposition to the Putin regime, wrote in 2021 after watching Putin’s press conference: “Putin’s whataboutism is already quite grotesque. Sobchak asks him about torture in the FSIN system [the penitentiary system], and he first of all begins to prove that they also torture in Europe. And at what here Europe? But no, it seems that Europe matters”.

In response to criticism of its own aggressive actions, including the ongoing aggressive war against Ukraine since 2014, Russian propaganda mentions NATO operations in Yugoslavia, Iraq and Afghanistan. The fact that they were carried out against misanthropic dictatorships engaged in ethnic cleansing and international terrorist networks does not bother the propagandists. The well-known Russian propaganda narrative about “8 years and the children of Donbas” also refers to “whataboutism”.

Pity is a fairly strong human emotion, because it appeals to a sense of justice and can cause a strong thirst for revenge on those who are the offender and aggressor. Russian propaganda uses these features of psychology in the “image of the victim” tactic. It often works together and is intertwined with heroization tactics, creating a synergistic effect.

An example of the use of “insulting the victim” is one of the key Russian propaganda narratives about “the children of Donbas, who were killed for 8 years”. Its symbolic expression is the so-called “Alley of Angels”, which was opened in Donetsk in 2015. The names of the children who died as a result of the Russian-Ukrainian war are minted there. The blame for this is laid, of course, on “Ukrainian Nazis and Bandera”. Russian propaganda deliberately does not mention that these children would be alive if there had not been a Russian military invasion in Donetsk and Luhansk region in 2014. So the occupiers want to shift the responsibility for unleashing the war and war crimes to Ukraine and justify their full-scale aggression in 2022 by appealing to the “killed children of Donbas”.

One of the fakes fueling the “8 years” narrative is the story of a little “boy in panties” allegedly crucified on a bulletin board “like Jesus”. “Ukrainian Nazi punishers” allegedly did this in 2014 in Sloviansk because the boy was the son of a Russian aggressor from the so-called DNR. True, the woman who told the propagandists this “shocking” story did not become happy in Russia and in 2021 complained about discrimination based on nationality in a “multinational country”.

Another key justification for full-scale aggression is the narrative that supposedly “Russia is defending itself against the Ukrainian Nazis and NATO” and its attack is only a preemptive strike. A number of different messages were used here, such as the existence of NATO biological laboratories in Ukraine for the development of biological weapons directed against Russia, as well as alleged attempts by Ukraine to create a “dirty nuclear bomb”, etc. In this narrative, the term “russophobia” plays an important role, which affects any negative reaction of other countries and the international community as a whole to the aggressive actions of Russia, and not only in Ukraine.

After the start of a full-scale Russian war against Ukraine in 2022, the concept of “russophobia” began to be used much more often, although it was talked about at least in the early 2000s. He tells the world allegedly about discrimination against Russia and Russians and double standards on it, which are used by the “collective West”. There is an appeal to Western liberal values and an attempt to put “russophobia” on a par with such, of course, negative phenomena as racism, anti-Semitism, sexism, homophobia, and so on.

The Russian Orthodox Church categorically supports Russia’s war against Ukraine. The Russian Orthodox Church takes part in the deportation of Ukrainians from the temporarily occupied territories and raises funds to help the Russian army. Patriarch Kyrylo believes that the death of a Russian soldier in this war allows him to get rid of all sins. He is joyfully echoed by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which is in canonical connection with the Russian Orthodox Church. Russian propaganda has repeatedly invoked religion to justify the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Long before 2014, the Kremlin used a dangerous weapon against Ukrainians - the soft power of religion. It is about the ability to influence through persuasion and argumentation, and not through coercion or violence. The Russian Orthodox Church is a form of soft power, and the strengthening of its religious supremacy serves the Kremlin's geopolitical goals.

Part of the Ukrainian clerics systematically plays along with the Russian propaganda machine. Let us remember the odious Pasha Mercedes, Metropolitan of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, who called the full-scale invasion of Russia “a war between America and Russia to the last Ukrainian”, rejoiced at the occupation of Kherson, and also spoke in unison with Russian propaganda, allegedly Russian troops “thrashed at those American laboratories in Kyiv and Odesa that the dust scattered from them ...".

Russian propaganda often depicts parishioners and clergy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) as martyrs for the truth, who are persecuted in Ukraine on religious grounds. Russia seeks to evoke strong feelings for the “suffering” believers (compassion, sympathy) and rage towards their “oppressors”. This tactic is often used by propagandists to divert attention from their own misconduct and to demonize opponents. For example, Russian propaganda compared President Zelenskyi and his “godless” policy towards the UOC with “manifestations of the devil”.

Russian propaganda is trying to discredit its “competitors” - the Orthodox Church of Ukraine: it labels them “schismatics” and in every possible way raises their authority. The policy of Ukraine towards the UOC is dictated by the Pentagon, which deliberately tries to breed all kinds of sects, cults, esoteric teachings of magicians, wizards and psychics, because these “religious subjects” are easy to control. For example, they can be forced to commit “terrorist acts” on the Crimean bridge or in Russia. This propaganda technique is designed to distract from the real situation, hide the true causes and consequences, and impose conspiracy theories.

All these propaganda techniques are designed to create the illusion of a religious civil conflict in Ukraine for both other states and Ukrainians, to split them along religious lines. Although in fact, all this is a well-directed performance in Moscow. The latest public opinion polls convincingly show that Ukrainians understand this: 78% of citizens believe that the state should interfere in one way or another in the activities of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. Among them, 54% believe that this religious institution should be completely banned in Ukraine.

Russian propagandists are positioning the USSR as a “golden day” to which everyone should return. This historical period remains important for Russian propaganda, as about 63% of Russians still miss the Soviet Union. Russian propaganda presents the collapse of the USSR as a catastrophe and speaks extremely negatively about those people who allegedly “destroyed the Union”, such as Mykhailo Horbachov, Borys Yeltsyn and Leonid Kravchuk. And any significant dates, such as May 9, when Russia celebrates Victory Day over Nazi Germany, are greeted with euphoria.

When one nevertheless has to recall the repressions and famines caused by the Soviet Union, they are presented as a forced victim of all the peoples of the USSR. And they condemn only the leaders of the state, and they do not pay attention to the performers. Movies are used to confirm that the Soviet Union was a great state. True or fictional stories from the life of Soviet people about their alleged heroism and self-sacrifice play a role similar to movie characters in the “heroization” propaganda tactic. After the occupation of the Ukrainian territories, the Russians bring back their Soviet heroes associated with these places. For example, Vasyl Marhelov and Pavlo Sudoplatov. Heroes mean little without images of enemies. Their role is most often played by the opponents of the USSR in the German-Soviet and Cold War; residents of countries that emerged after the collapse of the USSR; opponents of the power of modern Russia, etc. These enemies, as a rule, have only negative traits and play the role of a “standard of evil”, and their actions and ideas, according to propaganda, are always wrong and criminal.

Propaganda often uses the image of Joseph Stalin for its own purposes. Russian propaganda does not glorify the “leader” and does not even deny some of his atrocities, which they find justification for. Stalin is portrayed as “a strong leader who saved the country at a critical moment”, and his image resonates with the current image of Volodymyr Putin. Also, in the name of Stalin, Russian propagandists justify repressions in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine.

Russian propaganda speaks positively about the Soviet technology used by the occupying forces during the war against Ukraine. The same is with the objects that were built during the Soviet era. For example, if a bridge was damaged due to hostilities, Russian disinformers will write that the bridge survived because it was built in the USSR. So Russian propaganda uses the sentiment of the people and the feeling of nostalgia for something bright and ideal. Russia personifies the USSR, a state in which everything seemed to be fine, and is ready to bring this feeling to people again. This tactic is aimed primarily at Russians and residents of the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine.

Russian propaganda uses its versions of historical events against Ukraine to discredit and devalue the achievements of Ukrainians. Propagandists regularly spread manipulative statements about the history of our state, accusing Ukrainians of rewriting the history of Kyiv Rus, the Holodomor, World War II, or certain territories, in particular, Crimea and the eastern part of Ukraine. For example, Kremlin propaganda notes that Kyiv Rus was a “common state of ancestors”, which means that Ukraine and Russia have “same roots”.  Kyiv appears in such statements as “the mother of Russian cities”, which allegedly emphasizes the historical connection and strengthens the influence of the aggressor country on Ukraine. However, after the beginning of Russian aggression, disinformers almost stopped calling Kyiv Rus and began to focus on the leading role of Velykyi Novhorod in the formation of ancient Russian civilization.

Also, Russian propaganda tries to emphasize the positive aspects of the history of the USSR, significantly diminishing its negative consequences. This is how propagandists want to portray Russia as the successor to the Soviet Union and assert its influence over Ukraine. Russian propaganda downplays or denies the suffering experienced by Ukrainians during the Soviet era, especially during the Holodomor. It is portrayed as a general Soviet experience rather than a targeted genocide of Ukrainians. And the collapse of the Soviet Union is presented as “the greatest tragedy in the history of Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians”. The propagandists of the aggressor countries exaggerate the role of the Soviet Union in the victory over Nazi Germany in relation to other victorious states. At the same time, they selectively keep silent or downplay the contribution and sacrifices of Ukrainians, exalting and exaggerating the role of Russia. Russian propaganda often depicts all of Ukrainian nationalism and the independence movement as Nazi through the cooperation of individual Ukrainian nationalist groups with Germany during World War II.

To justify the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russian propaganda claims that Crimea “has always been a Russian land and an integral part of it”. Russian propaganda positively highlights the periods when the island was under Russian control. At the same time, they are silent about the history of the Crimean Khanate and any positive changes in the peninsula associated with Ukraine. In addition, disinformers try to justify Stalin’s deportation of the Crimean Tatars in 1944 by claiming that they were “Nazi collaborators”.

In addition to other areas of life, such as music, sports, show business, films and video games, Russian propaganda uses science and technology for its own purposes. Basically, it is the military-industrial complex, the space program and robotics. The latest developments of Russian science are presented as unique, having no analogues in the world, and will provide Russia with a qualitative advantage on the battlefield and in space.

After the illegal annexation of Crimea and Russia's resolution of the war in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in 2014, Western countries imposed the first sanctions against the aggressor country. At the same time, in Putin's Russia, the policy of import substitution began - the development of a domestic manufacturer to replace sanctioned goods with their own. Putin and his generals and officials have come up with the concept of “there is no analogue” and repeat it like a mantra, usually on models of weapons that do not yet exist. This is reminiscent of the World War II Nazi propaganda narrative of the “wunderwaffe”—the “wonder weapon”.

Putin scares the world with such “brilliant inventions of the domestic military-industrial complex” as the Sarmat missile system, the S-500 air and missile defense system, the Su-57 fighter, the T-14 Armata tank, etc. Usually, “analogue” types of weapons exist only in the imagination of Putin and his generals, are at the stage of prototypes, or in reality have significantly worse tactical and technical characteristics than officially declared.

 The space program has always been the pride of the USSR, and then Russia, and was used for propaganda purposes. For example, Yurii Haharin's flight into space in 1961 became an element of propaganda. In recent years, the program has been in decline, in particular, due to Russian aggression in Ukraine. The Russians are still on the International Space Station, but because of the war they are losing other opportunities for international space cooperation, other countries do not want to deal with the aggressor.

Are we losing the “space race”? It doesn’t matter, but one can “get creative” in propaganda: send the flag of the completely Russian-controlled “pseudo-republic of the LNR” to the International Space Station, draw the letter “Z” on a space rocket, be the first to make a feature film in space, call American rival Elon Musk on Twitter, or threaten to destroy the International Space station.

Music and songs have long served as a propaganda tool for many states, political regimes, parties and rulers. Russian propaganda uses musical works of various genres to achieve its goals, to increase the level of “patriotism” among the people and the army. Nostalgia for the Soviet past is one of the key themes in Russian music, which is used for propaganda during the full-scale war against Ukraine.

So, the singer Oleh Hazmanov at a concert in support of the so-called special military operation on March 18, 2022 performed the song “Born in the USSR”. And the song of the group “We are from the 90s” “I want to go back to the USSR” at the beginning of a full-scale war became a hit in the Russian segment of social networks and went viral. Also, in the music used by Russian propaganda, war is often romanticized and promoted. For example, the songs of the same Oleh Hazmanov are often used, such as “Officers” and “Soldiers of Russia”, or the “creativie works” of the Liube group, which is called Putin’s favorite group, are popular.

More than half of their songs belong to this genre, and they, like Hazmanov, are regular participants in propaganda concerts. At such events, the song of the Kino group “Kukushka” (Сuckoo) performed by Polina Haharina is often heard. The song became the official soundtrack of the propaganda film “Battle for Sevastopol” - a joint Ukrainian-Russian project.

In the Ukrainian box office, the tape was released under the name “Indestructible”. After the start of a full-scale war, new works appeared, imbued with hatred for Ukrainians, in particular, with calls for murder. Examples are the work of Wagner group called “SvynoriZ” and the song, which is called the obscene form of the word “Strike”. Russian propaganda “does not forget” about the youth either.

So, even before the full-scale aggression of 2022, hip-hop tracks were released, like “My best friend is President Putin” performed by Timati, and Volodymyr Putin from Slava CPSU, who has been banned from entering our country since 2017 through anti-Ukrainian statements. The most recent example of propaganda among young people is the “work” of the singer Shaman, whose image is specially tailored to this age group. His songs “Let's get up”, “I am Russian”, “Confession” and “My Russia” are gaining millions of views on YouTube among the audience infected with the criminal ideology of “rashism”. The singer combines in his work the image of a “young and modern rock star” with dreadlocks on his head with “patriotic” rhetoric and song themes, more typical for such singers with an audience “over 50 years old”, like Oleh Hazmanov and Hryhorii Leps.

The Russian authorities have been using sports as a propaganda tool since Soviet times. Famous athletes and coaches publicly express their support for Russia's armed aggression against Ukraine, and also speak at propaganda events of the Putin regime. The Ukrainian sports portal Trybuna, with the help of fans, has created and regularly updates the List of Shame - a database of Russian and Belarusian current and former athletes and coaches, as well as sports functionaries and officials who publicly supported Putin's aggression. Putin's pro-government United Russia party has been using popular ex-athletes as a mouthpiece for propaganda for decades. Some of them became deputies of the State Duma of Russia from the ruling party and found their place in the system of Russian power. Nine former athletes supported Russian aggression against Ukraine. Among them are boxers Mykolai Valuiev and Dmytro Pyroh, biathletes Anton Shypulin and Serhii Chepikov, hockey player Viacheslav Fetisov, chess player Anatolii Karpov, wrestler Artur Taimazov, figure skater Iryna Rodnina and speed skater Svitlana Zhurova. Active members of the sport also took part in Putin's propaganda activities after the start of the full-scale war and supported the aggression against Ukraine. The most famous are figure skaters Arina and Dina Averina, Aliona Kostorna, Kamila Valieva, Yelizaveta Tuktamysheva, skiers Oleksandr Bolshunov, Oleksandr Lehkov and Veronika Stepanova, wrestler Roman Vlasov, football players Artem Dziuba and Ari, mixed martial arts fightersOleksandr Yemelianenko, Oleksandr Shlemenko, Petro Yan. Russian gymnast Ivan Kulyiak went further and in March 2022 entered the World Cup stage awards with the letter “Z” on his suit, the main symbol of Russian aggression against Ukraine for which he was disqualified for a year.

Unfortunately, this list was not without traitors: some former Ukrainians have long supported the Putin regime and an aggressive war against their own country. Here we can distinguish chess player Serhii Kariakin, MMA fighter Oleksii Oliynyk and ex-volleyball player Taras Khtei. After the start of a full-scale war, most international sports institutions (not controlled by the Russians themselves) either completely banned Russian and Belarusian athletes from participating in competitions, or set conditions for them to compete in a neutral status: without flags, anthems, and subject to public condemnation of aggression against Ukraine. Russian propaganda, of course, began to shout about “double standards”, “politicization of sports” and “russophobia”. Even the Russian Foreign Ministry distinguished itself by this.

Slamming the door is a propaganda tactic that aims to increase the perception range of the target audience. This is achieved by artificially raising rates and expectations in order for people to accept a conditionally “middle” position. This technique is actively used in marketing, through which it came into the field of propaganda. For example, if a seller wants to sell an item for 100 UAH, but the public is only willing to pay 50 UAH, the seller first puts a higher price (for example, 200 UAH) and then lowers it to 100 UAH to make it look like a bargain. Russian propagandists often and actively use this tactic. Recently, Russia's desire to sign a peace treaty and secure the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine has become a very popular narrative. Against the background of the counter-offensive of the Ukrainian Defense Forces and the inevitable liberation of the occupied Ukrainian lands, propagandists are promoting messages that Western support for Ukraine will soon be significantly reduced, our country will be left alone with Russia and the consequences for it will be much worse and more tragic than the loss of those territories under a peace treaty which are now occupied. In a somewhat modified form, this tactic is used to speed up Russian passportization in the temporarily occupied territories. The occupiers on local telegram channels advertise ordinary Russian social payments and digital public services as great advantages and achievements, deliberately “forgetting” that they themselves, by their occupation, deprived people of absolutely the same payments and services from Ukraine and put the local population on the brink of survival. This tactic was also used in April - May 2022, when Russian propaganda actively promoted the narrative that the ruble is perhaps the most stable and dynamically growing currency in the world. The Russian currency at that time did grow somewhat, but only against the backdrop of a terrible and catastrophic fall in March of the same year after the introduction of Western sanctions against the aggressor country.

Selective truth is a propaganda tactic that partly uses the truth to mislead people and achieve its own goals. The statement may be partially true, may be entirely true (but not include the whole truth), or may contain several deceptive elements such as mispunctuation, double meanings, misrepresentation of the truth. Russian propaganda often and actively uses this tactic. A recent example is the claim by disinformers that the Kakhovka hydroelectric power station was destroyed by water pressure due to damage in 2022 as a result of shelling by American HIMARS MLRS. There were indeed shellings, but as a result of them only the roadbed on the dam was damaged and they definitely could not entail such large-scale destruction of the dam itself. Western experts are inclined to believe that the Kakhovka HPP was destroyed due to an explosion from the inside. Another example is the numerous reports of pro-Russian anonymous telegram channels about losses in the battle for Bakhmut. The propagandists write only about the supposedly heavy losses of the Defense Forces, completely “forgetting” about the losses of the Russian armed forces and the Wagner group, which Western officials estimate at about 60 thousand people.

Of course, unfortunately, the Defense Forces suffered significant losses in Bakhmut, but this “feast victory” cost the infidels many times more. One of the main disinformation narratives of Russian propaganda is the assertion that Western sanctions will not have a negative impact on the Russian economy. Among them there is a message that the ruble is growing, strengthening and is perhaps the most stable currency in the world. This message was especially actively promoted at the beginning of a full-scale invasion. There was some truth in this, but Russian propagandists deliberately kept silent about the fact that their currency fell rapidly and very strongly in March 2022 against the backdrop of the introduction of Western sanctions for aggression against Ukraine and only in April began to recover. It should also be understood that the Russian currency was saved from a further rapid fall by manual regulation of the economy, which always leads to extremely negative consequences in the future. The disinformers “forgot” that the ruble in April 2022 grew slightly only against the US dollar, but this was by no means an absolute indicator.

Flag-waving propaganda tactics are used to justify an action on the grounds that it is patriotic or that it benefits the country, group, or cause that the target audience supports. This tactic uses patriotic symbols (national banner, anthem, patriotic symbols) to evoke a sense of national pride and loyalty. Propagandists appeal to the sense of patriotism, which is sacred to many people, by appealing to the values and identity of the nation.

Flag waving has its roots deep in history. So, even during the French Revolution, the Legislative Assembly of France on July 11, 1792 issued a decree entitled The Motherland Is In Danger. At that time, the French Revolution was under the threat of defeat, external (Austria, Prussia and other states) and internal (nobility, clergy) enemies were actively attacking the young republic. This decree helped to rally and mobilize French society to repulse enemies on the basis of patriotism and preserve the republican structure in the country.

Other examples of “flag-waving” are the Uncle Sam slogan “I need you for the United States Army” and the Soviet “Motherland Calls!”. They appealed to patriotism and sacrifice for the sake of their native countries and used the personifications of the USA and the USSR of “Uncle Sam” and “Motherland”.

Through this tactic, Russian President Volodymyr Putin justified the invasion of Ukraine, the so-called “special military operation”. Allegedly, the expansion of NATO threatens the very existence of the Russian Federation, and it only defends itself, protecting its national interests, in Ukraine rampant Nazism and the genocide of the pro-Russian population.

Another example of the use of this tactic is the policy of so-called “import substitution”  carried out in Russia since 2014, when Western states imposed the first sanctions against it for the illegal annexation of Crimea. It is accompanied by a corresponding information campaign, where there is a strong appeal to patriotism. Like, we do not need Western goods, our analogues are no worse than them, we need to develop and stimulate domestic producers, and so on.

Propaganda uses the tactic of “relocation” to create permanent associations in the audience with certain symbols or constant expressions. They can be both positive and cause approval, and negative to discredit certain people, communities or phenomena.

Soviet and later Russian propaganda never used the term “Warrior of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army”, but called them “Bandera”. This word in the USSR and Russia has a strong association with bandits and Nazi collaborators. The red and black flag of the OUN and UPA has the same negative connotation for Russian propaganda, for the patriots of Ukraine it is a symbol of will, inflexibility and liberation struggle against any foreign invaders.

During the full-scale war of 2022-2023, Russian propaganda often prefers to call UAF soldiers “Nazis”, “militants”, “mercenaries” and so on. Thus, there is a movement from the soldiers of the regular army of an independent state to irregular gangs of various rabble. In order to avoid the terrible word “war” to denote a full-scale invasion of Ukraine and to call it, if not positively, then at least neutrally, the Putin authorities came up with the ludicrous phrase “special military operation”.

Russian propaganda is also trying to use supposedly positive symbols to increase support and justify aggression against Ukraine. The so-called St. George ribbon has been a military symbol of Russia since the 18th century, meaning military glory and valor. It retained its significance even in the Soviet Union and became one of the symbols of victory. In modern Russia, the St. George Ribbon is widespread and popular, since it is not associated with the communist regime of the USSR, which has a very ambiguous attitude inside the country, despite the fact that the Soviet past actively serves Russian propaganda.

Another symbol is the so-called “victory flag”, which Russian propaganda sacralized as part of the hyperbolization of Russia’s role in the victory over Nazism and made it one of the key elements of the “victory”, which is the cornerstone of the modern state ideology of “racism”.

Using the vague assumption tactic, propagandists present the messages they want to the audience in the format of multiple guesses or hints. This is done to inspire more credibility, because the message itself may sound unconvincing. When people hear repeated fuzzy assumptions or hints, they themselves come up with the “truth” that propagandists need.

An example of the use of this tactic is the propaganda messages that appeared after Russian missiles hit Khmelnytskyi and Ternopil region on May 13, 2023. Pro-Russian anonymous telegram channels provided the messages they needed precisely in the format of vague assumptions of varying degrees. The least clear of them were the following: “The consequences of the strike at the ammunition warehouse in Khmelnytskyi. Most of the object was destroyed by the explosion and secondary detonations. There is no information about what was in the warehouses, as well as a photo of the work of the State Emergency Service” and “Here is such a memo that appeared in public places in cities in the Khmelnytskyi region. The Ministry of Health of Ukraine reminds of the need to follow  radiation safety rules. However, at the official level, so far no one has explained anything: what actually exploded in warehouses in the Ternopil region”. Such reports, combined with clearer ones about the uranium cores of shells for British Challenger 2 tanks, were intended to create panic and a sense of a radiation threat among Ukrainians, as well as to show the alleged aggressiveness and desire to escalate the war on the part of the Western allies.

Another example of the use of allusions in propaganda is a report by another pro-Russian anonymous telegram channel, which criticizes the statement of the Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine Ihor Klymenko about the fact that men who illegally left Ukraine will be punished: “A Ukrainian who is abroad is outraged that people's deputies are preparing to adopt a bill on criminal liability for men who have gone abroad. I wonder if such a law is passed, what will the sons of Danilov and Stefanchuk do? And the sons of other bureaucrats and businessmen. Will they be given a disability? Or something else?”. Here propagandists make an indirect allusion to the fact that the sons of the highest officials of Ukraine Oleksii Danilov and Ruslan Stefanchuk are allegedly illegally abroad, with the aim of discrediting the authorities as a whole and accusing them of double standards.

“Join the masses” is a propaganda tactic by which propaganda backs up its messages with claims supported by large masses of people. This is how propagandists try to convince the audience that everything they say is true. This tactic is based on conformism - the tendency of people to adapt, bow before authorities, accept opinions and positions shared by the majority of representatives of their social group.

As part of this tactic, propagandists can use both truthful data, sociological surveys in their favor, and manipulate them and resort to perversions. There are also links to frankly custom or even fictitious surveys that no one has conducted. Such technologies are often used during elections to add votes to certain parties or blocs, because people tend to vote for those who are supposedly stronger and have more support. How this works is noticeable when candidates try to overcome electoral barriers: the voter fears that his or her vote will actually be “lost” if they vote for a party that does not overcome the barrier. Therefore, due to false opinion polls, their choice may change at the last moment. Texty.org.ua has collected a whole database of Ukrainian pseudo-sociologists, some of whom openly worked for Russian propaganda, which also uses this tactic for its own purposes. In particular, in a full-scale war.

For example, one of the pro-Russian anonymous telegram channels to discredit the Ukrainian authorities cited data from a real sociological survey “Veterans' Needs” conducted by the Ukrainian Veterans Fund. In the title of the message, the authors made the wording “53% of Ukrainian veterans believe that the Ukrainian state is not fulfilling its obligations to them”. In this case, the propagandists resorted to brutal manipulation: they used the opinion of veterans who fought against the Russian occupiers to promote anti-Ukrainian messages.

Another example of propagandists using sociological surveys for their own purposes is the report of an anonymous telegram channel about the results of the Internews study, according to which 74% of Ukrainians consume information from social networks (60% specifically from telegrams), and only 36% trust television. Propaganda uses these numbers to criticize the United News telethon and accuse the authorities of censoring television. The marathon is opposed to the telegram, which supposedly is a platform for obtaining independent and objective information. At the same time, the authors of the messages deliberately do not mention that over the past few years, people in the world have mainly consumed information on the Internet, and not from traditional media. Anonymous telegram channels, which spread the thesis of government censorship, are often sources of disinformation, in particular pro-Russian. Due to their anonymity, they do not accept any responsibility for their content.

Third party is a propaganda tactic in which propaganda seeks and publicizes a third, independent opinion in order to validate its messages. The target audience finds it easier and more likely to trust an independent opinion that is not related to the stakeholders. This technique is used not only in propaganda, but also in advertising and marketing. Journalists, media, scientists, and experts are used as independent sources.

Pro-Russian telegram channels regularly use as a third opinion quotes from Western media, speeches by politicians and experts, often taking them out of context or distorting them in order to confirm their propaganda messages, to give them greater independence and authority. We wrote about this in more detail in a study on the MediaPost telegram channel, created by Russian propaganda specifically to distort and use Western media content for their own purposes.

In practice, this tactic, for example, works like this: one of the pro-Russian anonymous telegram channels in its message refers to an article by the Polish journalist Endzhey Bielecki for the Rzeczpospolita newspaper, which allegedly contains information that despite Poland’s insistence, the United States will not support Ukraine’s entry into NATO that Ukraine will be given only modest security guarantees and will have to put up with territorial losses. This is how propagandists use the authority of the Polish newspaper as an “independent source” to confirm their messages. Disinformers reinforce their thesis that Western aid to Ukraine will soon be seriously curtailed and our state will be left face to face in the war with Russia.

The Russian propagandist in the message of her personalized telegram channel used the data of the British betting company Smarkets. Based on betting odds, it claims that Ukraine will not win the war, will not become a member of NATO or even the EU. The argument is that bookmakers “know how to count their money”. The propagandist also focuses on the results of the voting of bookmakers’ clients, who also do not believe in Ukraine. That is, the disinformer used the authority of the bookmaker to allegedly confirm her propaganda messages in order to create the appearance that Ukraine would lose in the war with Russia and would never become a member of the EU and NATO.

Out-of-context is a conscious or unconscious mistake in which a certain passage of text is taken out of it and often takes on a completely different meaning, out of context. In propaganda, this technique is often used to manipulate the words of famous people, in particular politicians or the military.

Russian propaganda constantly uses words and phrases taken out of context to discredit Ukraine in various ways. So, in June 2022, disinformers dispersed the message, supposedly the then British Prime Minister Boris Johnson said that “the world is tired of Ukraine”. In fact, the head of the British government warned against a possible “slight Ukraine fatigue” that has begun to appear in the world. Johnson also stressed that it would be a “disaster” if Russian President Volodymyr Putin succeeded in Ukraine.

Propagandists recently circulated a distorted speech by US Chief General in Europe Christopher Cavoli, where he allegedly said that the Russian military allegedly “has not been affected negatively” in the war, and Western media seem to distort information about the “degradation” of Russian troops. In fact, the general stated only about Russian patrols in the Atlantic Ocean, that it was precisely this part of their troops that the war had not affected.

Russian disinformers spread a manipulative message that President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyi carries a pistol with him to shoot himself in case of danger. In fact, Zelenskyi has a gun exclusively for self-defense.

The fantasy of Russian propaganda sometimes leads to curious cases. So, in June 2022, propagandists took the words of the wife of the President of Ukraine Olena Zelenska out of context and distorted them so that their 9-year-old son Kyrylo is allegedly a military adviser to the President. In fact, Olena Zelenska told the British newspaper Daily Mail how she communicates with her children on the topic of the war and how the reaction of her eldest daughter Oleksandra and her youngest son Kyrylo differ. This was done in order to ridicule Volodymyr Zelenskyi, show his alleged incompetence and reduce the authority of the President in the international arena.

Disinformation is the misleading of an adversary or competitor with false information, false documents or audiovisual materials. Disinformation as a tool, in particular, is used for propaganda, military and commercial purposes. Russian propaganda uses it systematically to, for example, discredit the Ukrainian government, split society, create despondency about the victory of Ukraine, etc. Also, disinformers are trying to convince Western allies that Ukraine is an unreliable partner, a “failed state”, etc. Another function of disinformation is to rally the Russian people in support of the so-called SVO, a full-scale military aggression against Ukraine.

With the start of a full-scale war against Ukraine, Russian propaganda began to work even more actively than 8 years before. For example, one of the disinformation attacks at the beginning of a full-scale war was the drawing of marks on roads and houses. The attack had some success: state structures and law enforcement agencies of Ukraine at first perceived the tags as a serious threat. It was believed that they help the ground forces of the enemy navigate the territory of Ukraine, help direct missile and air strikes, position for snipers and conditional marks for saboteurs. Law enforcement officers detained many for applying these labels. It turned out that this was disinformation to spread panic and chaos in Ukrainian society, to show that there are many potential traitors in it who are ready to help the enemy for money.

Also, Russia systematically spreads messages that military assistance to Ukraine from Western partners is useless, because they allegedly sell weapons to third countries, criminal groups around the world, including the EU, and even ISIS terrorists. On August 5, 2022, the American television channel CBS released a 23-minute report “We arm Ukraine”. This product contained a number of manipulations with the help of supposedly Western experts and promoted the Russian propaganda message that 70% of American weapons in Ukraine are stolen and only 30% end up at the front. After a sharp reaction from the Ukrainian authorities and a wave of criticism, the channel removed this film. Disinformation of this kind is dangerous, because it can lead to a decrease in military and financial assistance from Western allies.

Also, Russian propaganda regularly spreads disinformation to accuse Ukraine of developing the so-called “dirty nuclear bomb” and preparing provocations using it. Propagandists claim that the Ukrainians want to add nuclear fuel from its nuclear power plant to a conventional bomb and use it against Russian or civilian troops. So, Russia is trying to present Ukraine as an aggressor state and a threat to the nuclear security of the whole world.

The great lie is a propaganda technique described back in 1925 by Adolf Hitler in the book “My Struggle”, which became the ideological basis of national socialism.

The German dictator defined this concept as “a lie is so great that no one will believe that someone had the courage to distort reality so shamelessly”.

A correctly arranged and well-thought-out “great lie” causes a deep emotional trauma in the listener or viewer, which then determines their views for a long time, contrary to any arguments of logic and reason. False descriptions of the abuse of children or women work especially well in this sense. Russian propaganda has studied well the heritage, principles and methods of its “sworn ideological enemy” Hitler and often uses this technique in its work.

An example of a systemic disinformation narrative is the alleged work of numerous “American biological laboratories” in Ukraine. Russian propagandists spread extremely absurd messages about the presence in Ukraine of fighting mosquitoes, birds and bats, designed to spread dangerous viruses to the soldiers of the occupying army. The continuation of this narrative was fakes about the presence of dangerous infectious diseases in the blood of captured soldiers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, for example, West Nile fever. Russian propaganda noted that “secret experiments” were carried out on them, which turned the Ukrainian military into “super-hard monsters”.

Propagandists came up with other completely wild fakes. Thus, they claimed that during the defense of Mariupol in 2022, “Ukrainian Nazis from Azov allegedly raped pregnant women [local residents hiding in basements from shelling] for food” and tortured them. Some of the girls were minors.

Russian propaganda used the “great lie” during the ATO in 2014-2015. One can recall the fake about the alleged crucifixion and burning alive of a DNR militant (“militia”) by “mercenaries of the Azov battalion”, as well as, of course, the “immortal classic” - the crucifixion of a “boy in panties” in Sloviansk after his release in 2014 from Russian terrorist gangs of Ihor Strielkov (Girkin). In both cases, an allusion to the crucifixion of Jesus Christ is used, which fits well into the general outline of Russian propaganda, one of the cornerstones of which is Orthodoxy.

A prejudice is a delusion that is formed in a person under external influence in relation to certain people, objects or phenomena. This happens without direct experience, the use of critical thinking and sufficient objective evidence.

Negative biases can be created based on gender, race, nationality, or ethnicity. Russian propaganda constantly appeals to all sorts of prejudices.

An example of the use of a number of prejudices is a comment by Dmytro Medvediev, deputy chairman of the Russian Security Council, after blocking his English-language Twitter profile. “Twitter caved in under the State Department and hohols (Ukrainians)”, “Russia's main task is to inflict a crushing defeat on all enemies: the Ukronazis, the United States, their minions in NATO, including disgusting Poland, and other Western nits”. Prejudice against Ukrainians, the United States and its government, other Western allies of Ukraine, in particular Poland, is applied here.

Also, Russian propaganda broadcasts the prejudices of foreign volunteers who defend Ukraine with weapons in their hands. So, in the news about the death of American Andrew Harris Cooper in Bakhmut, they use the terms “bandit” and “mercenary”, and also descend to outright racism. Similar rhetoric is used in the news about the death of two Canadian volunteers.

In the “oversimplification of the cause” propaganda tactic, Russian propagandists often use desired generalizations to provide simple answers to complex social, political, economic, or military problems. The point is to promote simple answers to complex questions.

An example of the simplified logic of propaganda is the message that Ukrainians are trying to dissociate themselves from Russia geopolitically, economically, culturally and politically, because the so-called “collective West” insists on this. In fact, Ukrainians are striving for the country to become a member of the EU and NATO, because Ukraine is an independent and sovereign state and has the right to make its own choice without additional conditions. Western countries have real democracy, fair competition, great economic opportunities, the rule of law, etc. That is why Ukraine seeks ties with them, and not with Russia, where an aggressive militaristic totalitarian regime reigns, where a person is disenfranchised, an insane level of corruption and a poor level of infrastructure development in most of the country.

Another example of the logic of Russian propagandists is the message that Ukraine fulfills all the whims of the IMF, which always harms ordinary people. In reality, everything is more complicated: unfortunately, Ukraine still cannot do without IMF loans. Tranches are also not provided just like that: the Fund, as a creditor, calculates the most optimal options on how to push the Ukrainian economy to development so that it can pay off its debts, and not get bogged down in a debt hole and collapse.

Russian propaganda often complains about the sanctions imposed on Russia by Western powers. They emphasize that this is discrimination and their favorite word is “russophobia”. So, propaganda greatly simplifies the understanding of the problem and creates the image of a victim for the aggressor country. At the same time, hostile propagandists deliberately “forget” a key point: the first sanctions were introduced in 2014 not without reason, but in response to Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea, as well as parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. In addition, it was Russia that unleashed a bloody and brutal war against Ukraine from 2014 to the present day. The soldiers of the occupying army kill and rape Ukrainian prisoners of war, as well as the civilian population (including children), destroy the homes of ordinary people and the infrastructure of the entire country.

A “scapegoat” is a tactic that mitigates the responsibility for those guilty of something by shifting the responsibility to someone else - the so-called “scapegoat”. This is one of the main tactics of Russian propaganda, which propagandists use to justify the war crimes of the Russian occupiers.

An example of the use of tactics is the statements by Russian propagandists that the bloody massacre committed by the occupying army in Bucha was staged by the Ukrainian authorities. To reinforce its version, the propaganda allegedly used the words of a citizen of France, an ally of Ukraine, which is actively supplying us with military equipment. Disinformers claimed that some of the corpses that Ukrainian soldiers allegedly decomposed on the streets of Bucha to film the dramatization were civilians killed by the Ukrainian army during the “civil war” in Ukraine.

Russian propagandist Oleksandr Malkevych, who is in charge of the occupiers for the Kherson region, in December 2022 accused the Ukrainian army of shelling the liberated Kherson. He stated that the shelling (which is indeed carried out by the Russian army from the temporarily occupied left bank of the Dnipro) was supposed to divert public attention from the terrible humanitarian situation in the city after the liberation by the Ukrainians. The city really had a problem with communications, food and the like, but the humanitarian crisis arose precisely because of the capture of the city by the Russians, who purposefully destroyed the critical infrastructure of Kherson. It was because of the Russians that the residents of the city spent about a month without electricity, water, heating, communications and the Internet, in some areas even longer.

Also, according to Russian propaganda, the Azov regiment is terrible Nazis and punishers. Thus, propagandists spread a fake that the soldiers of the regiment in Mariupol allegedly “raped pregnant girls for food”. With such false news, propagandists are trying to divert attention from the numerous facts of terrible sexual crimes of Russian invaders on the territory of Ukraine: they raped children and the elderly, did it in front of their close relatives and so on.

In its investigation, Detector Media described how Russian propaganda is hiding behind the children of Donbas to justify war crimes in Ukraine. Like, the Russians are fighting for the children of Donbas, who are allegedly destroyed by Ukrainian Nazis and punishers. This topic is also an example of “scapegoat” propaganda tactics, as disinformers deliberately “forget” who exactly carried out the military invasion and illegal annexation of the territory of a sovereign state in 2014, which led to the death of not only children.

Imposing shameful “epithets” is a tactic used by propagandists when addressing people. These are abusive and insulting words referring to a specific group of persons or one person, in order to form a “correct vision” of a phenomenon or process, according to propaganda. So, if a propagandist wants to change his/her mind about this or that person and form the desired effect (negative attitude) among the viewer/listener and reader, he or she uses profanity, imposes nicknames and shameful “epithets” on the opponent.

Repeatedly propagandists turned to the personality of Volodymyr Zelenskyi, trying to humiliate and devalue him in the eyes of Ukrainians. With the help of Russian propaganda, Zelenskyi was able to appear in various roles, in particular:

A vain person who spends all budgetary funds only on himself;

A punisher-satanist, destroying the Ukrainian church property;

A person with drug addiction;

A theft of Western money;

A puppet puppet controlled by the West;

Inhuman, throwing “everyone” to the front, etc.

Such “epithets” are intended to form a negative image of Zelenskyi among the public, allegedly reinforced by his actions. Propagandists deliberately build the image of “Zelia” as an envoy of the West in order to undermine his authority both among Europeans and Ukrainians.

As for the formation of negative attitudes towards a certain group of people, in our study “You are either Russian or gay”, we described the use of offensive words by Russia to spread LGBT disinformation. For example, in the course of our analysis, both in the Russian and Ukrainian segments of social networks, the words “gayropa”, “evrogay”, “UN gay assembly”, “gaysek of the Council of Europe”, “hohlopedyk” were often encountered. Such words are hate speech towards representatives of the LGBTI+ community.

Propagandists use perverted phrases to ridicule and humiliate LGBT people. Readers get the impression that everything that concerns LGBT people is negative. Moreover, when the authors spread fakes and use swear words about LGBT people to refer to Ukrainian or Western leadership, in this way they associate homosexuality with something humiliating, a sign of weakness or incompetence, etc. Although homosexuality is the same common orientation as heterosexuality.

The tactic of heroization is one of the methods of military propaganda that has several key tasks. First, to consolidate the masses around a common goal – in the context of Russian aggression, this goal is the”denazification” and “liberation” of Ukrainian territories. Secondly, to inculcate the “correct” values and types of behavior, that is, to consolidate loyalty to the regime, active support for the army, and a desire to join military operations in society. Thirdly, to divert attention from urgent problems, compensating for them with dubious “achievements”. Fourth, once again justify and rationalize aggression by strengthening the desire for revenge. In addition, heroization gives rise to a romanticized vision of death, destruction and human suffering, and thus darkens the realities of war and emasculates the cost of human losses.

This tactic became popular with the outbreak of full-scale war. After all, during the first eight years of the war, Russian propagana appealed to suffering images: “the outcast people of Donbas”, “Russian-speaking Ukrainians curtailed in their rights”, “tortured children of Donbas”, “Orthodox believers persecuted for the truth”, “desecrated Soviet monuments”... The propaganda aim is to appeal to torment and suffering - to cause, on the one hand, hatred for the “punishers”, to demonize and dehumanize them, and on the other hand, to arouse sympathy for the “victims” and rationalize the generous “aid” - gum convoys of weapons. It is difficult to maintain morale if it is based only on sympathy or pity. That is why Russia glorifies 11-year-old Fiodor from the Briansk region: a group of “Ukrainian saboteurs” allegedly attacked him and two schoolgirls. The guy was wounded, the “NATO bullet” was stuck in the body, but he did not lose his head, he saved himself and the girls, running away to a safe place.

The story of the boy Fiodor appeals to strong emotions. Russian propaganda is trying to arouse sympathy for Fiodor: the little guy got into a situation from which not every adult could get out. It makes one empathize and admire - a wounded “hero” with a bullet in his body saves himself and two of his age. In addition, the courage of the schoolboy contrasts with the audacity of the “saboteurs”. If one projects these emotions into specific actions, they will get respect for the “heroism”, fierce hatred for Ukrainians and a desire for revenge.

"Love bombing" is a tactic used by propagandists to attract people to their cult or ideology. It works like this: they try to cut a person off from existing social support and replace him or her with communication with members of a particular group, that is, supporters of a particular ideology, who deliberately bombard the person with affection, trying to isolate them from the previous belief and value system.

For example, Russian propagandists are trying to convince those in Bakhmut that they should support Russia. The messages of supposedly former residents of the city, who have already “evacuated” to the aggressor state, are oriented towards civilians. There are also statements from seemingly residents of Bakhmut that they have “suffered a lot from the Ukrainian army over the past 9 years”, are waiting for the arrival of “real liberators” from Russia and, in order to speed it up, they even adjust the fire on their city. The tactic of “love bombing” in such messages is used to justify cruelty with humane intentions.

“Love bombing” was also used in the hope of reaching out to the military defending Bakhmut. For example, they circulated publications about other Ukrainian military men who seemed to have “smiled with happiness” and were taken into Russian captivity, where they seem to be treated well.

The Russians used “love bombing” tactics when they violated international law and forced Ukrainians to leave for Russia. They present the deportation as a “vacation in Russia”, and the war against Ukraine as “revenge for the children of Donbas”.

The Kremlin uses show business as a tool to influence public opinion and to spread Russian propaganda. Artists with a large number of fans publicly express their support for Russia's armed aggression against Ukraine, and also perform at propaganda events both in Russia itself and in the temporarily occupied Ukrainian territories.

So, a year ago, Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine was accompanied by massive reports of Russian “starship landings”. For example, Russian singer Nikolai Baskov wrote on his Instagram that “Russia's operation is in full compliance with international law”. He believes that Russia is using the right to self-defense and the protection of its allies (the so-called DNR and LNR). Baskov's position was supported by the Russian radio and TV presenter and actress Alla Dovlatova. Another TV presenter, Tina Kandelaki, rebuked those who condemn Russia's aggression against Ukraine. These people relayed Kremlin talking points to justify Russia's actions.

In addition, the Ministry of Culture, together with the Russian Ministry of Defense, recently announced the formation of propaganda teams, which include Russian artists. These brigades are created, in particular, in order to organize concerts, including in the regions, to raise the fighting mood among the mobilized. Similar propaganda teams also existed under the Soviet Union, when artists were used for political agitation and propaganda.

At the same time, Russian artists spread propaganda not only in Russia. They also travel with concerts to the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine and perform at propaganda events. Moreover, some representatives of the Russian show business at one time received the passports of the so-called DNR and LNR. Thus, they tried to legitimize these pseudo-republics and support the position of the Kremlin.

“Cinema is the most important art”, said Bolshevik Lenin, praising the Soviet school of cinema (according to Russian propaganda). Volodymyr Putin also vowed to keep an eye on Russian cinema when he recently commissioned films about the war against Ukraine to be shown in Russian cinemas. More precisely, the films are called upon to “fight against the spread of neo-Nazi and neo-fascist ideology”. The order from Putin states that the Ministry of Defense will assist Russian documentary filmmakers in preparing cinematographic material about the participants in the so-called “special operation” (in reality, a full-scale war), who “showed courage, bravery and heroism”. However, are courage, bravery and heroism inherent in the Russian occupiers? Russian propaganda is trying to build a favorable image of “military heroes” by using cinematography.

“Bandera”, “supporters of the Nazis”, “goofs in bloomers” - such a Ukrainian is in Russian cinema, created by order of Moscow. Russian films methodically use stereotypes to speculate about Ukrainians and other non-Russian peoples. Thus, Russian propaganda distorts reality and imposes stereotypes on viewers who begin to believe in an alternative reality. In addition to demonizing Ukrainians, Moscow often resorts to “toxic nostalgia” and revolves around its stereotypes of a “good Soviet Union” and a “victorious Great Patriotic War” to nourish the narrative about the existence of a “one people”, mentally uniting Russians with Ukrainians.

In 2014, with the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian war, a film called “Russian Character” was released. The film was released on December 28, 2014, that is, less than a year after the occupation of Crimea. This is a story about how in 2013 a Russian naval officer comes on vacation to his grandfather in the Crimea and learns that he was killed by “Bandera”. Also, messages are constantly being promoted about “Crimea is ours”, “oppression of Russian-speaking people”, “the vile nature of Ukrainians who spoke Russian all their lives, and suddenly remembered that they are Ukrainians”, etc.

And Lenin's phrase about cinema, as they say, sounds like this in full: “While the people are illiterate, of all the arts, cinema and the circus are the most important for us”. The Russian authorities operate on the same principle.

Rationalization is a propaganda tactic that works as a psychological defense. For example, it is used when they want to prove that any actions of a person or, as in our case, a country are the only correct ones. Therefore, it is not worth questioning and criticizing them. This tactic works in cases where one needs to explain some actions that caused a negative reaction from the audience. That is, a person or a group of people does not admit their guilt, but on the contrary, they try to justify themselves and prove their case with supposedly logical concepts. Like, otherwise it would be impossible to act. Rationalization also helps to maintain self-respect, avoid responsibility and guilt. That is, in any rationalization there is at least a minimum amount of truth, but the percentage of self-deception is much higher.

With the help of this tactic, Russian propaganda regularly tries to justify its actions in Ukraine, seeks to justify its aggression towards peaceful Ukrainians. For example, during the year of a full-scale war (and long before it), there were theses that Russia was forced to conduct military operations in Ukraine, because the Ukrainian authorities were allegedly guided by the West and wanted to harm Russia itself. Like, if Russia had not started the war, Ukraine or the so-called collective West would have started it. This is how the propaganda rationalizes its actions, allegedly explaining that it was impossible to do otherwise in this situation. However, the only truth in this example is that Ukraine really chose a course towards the European direction (that is, it cooperates with the West), defended its language and statehood, but was not going to attack either Russia or Russians. Similarly, Western countries do not attack Russia, however, among the justifying messages there are those who claim that it was the Western country that supposedly started the war with Russia on the territory of Ukraine, and Russia allegedly had no choice. Through this tactic, Russian propaganda creates the appearance that Russia is doing the right thing. They say, yes, people suffer because of the war, cities are destroyed, but our choice was rational and it was impossible to act otherwise.

“This is happening now, which means that…” This is a typical message template using the “primacy effect” propaganda tactic. It is used when it is necessary to form the desired attitude to events or processes about which there is no reliable information. The first one to report information, offer a version, how to understand it and cover the largest audience, has the highest chances of establishing his or her opinion in society.

The tactic of the “primacy effect” is used when it is necessary to react to a news occasion from opponents. The response does not have to be coordinated or truthful. The main thing is to promptly report the probable version of the incident. For example, when at dawn on October 8, 2022, a section of the bridge connecting the temporarily occupied Crimea with the Krasnodar territory of Russia fell into the sea, Russian propagandists reported the following versions of the event:

- train tank exploded with fuel,

- it was NATO that arranged the explosion,

- Ukrainian special services carried out a terrorist act.

Which of the versions one would not have come across first, each of them gave an explanation for what happened and pointed to the “guilty”.

The primacy effect tactic works well as an accompaniment to crimes committed by Russians themselves.

On October 10, two days after the explosion on the bridge to the Crimea, the Russians fired on the objects of the energy system of Ukraine. In the first hours after that, Ukrainian pro-Russian telegram channels, in order to cause panic and force the Russians to yield, offered ten versions of the explanation of what happened:

- Ukraine's air-defense system is useless and the Russians easily bypass it,

- the Ukrainians themselves brought trouble on themselves by attacking the Crimean bridge;

- the authorities of Ukraine hush up the catastrophe and forbid reporting the destruction,

- it will be even worse further, it is not for nothing that the embassies of other states leave Ukraine.

Propagandists also use the tactics of the “primacy effect” to form expectations for the future or to convince the audience that they are right. In the Ukrainian telegram segment, there are telegram channels that “specialize” in the distribution of all kinds of supposedly insider versions of certain events. The authors of such channels in their messages regularly refer to anonymous sources, offering the audience the so-called insiders. Also in the messages of channels there are often phrases like “there are rumors”, “our insider in ... reported”, “they are talking on the sidelines..”. For each of the informational occasions that fall into the field of view of the authors of these telegram channels, they offer more than one interpretation or forecast of what is happening and what will happen next. In the course of events, these reports are intended to set the propagandist's favorable interpretation of the situation. After at least one of the interpretations will come true, these messages serve to confirm the trust in the sources of telegram channels. Other false reports may be forgotten or serve as the basis for further explanation of new news stories.

“Ordinary people” is a tactic by which propaganda convinces the audience that the position of the propagandists coincides with the position of the majority and reflects common sense. Thus, propagandists seek to gain the trust of the audience by trying to communicate with them in the same language. That is, in the most simple words, understandable to a wide audience. Also, as part of this tactic, propagandists try to explain the concepts or processes they need using supposedly understandable examples, that is, close or known to the target audience.

Russian propaganda is using the “ordinary people” tactics, spreading the message that hunger will come all over the world through Ukraine. This is how propagandists take a topic that concerns the majority and assure that because of the war in Ukraine and even more because of the resistance that it is showing to Russia, first Ukrainians themselves, and later people in other countries, will die of hunger. For example, the Russian edition of RIA Novosti (RIA news) published an article entitled “Europe is running out of food”, which says that soon a food crisis will come in Europe. In fact, there will be food in Europe, but it may rise in price (which has already happened during the year of the big war against Ukraine) due to general inflation and fuel prices. In addition, due to the destroyed logistics, the range of goods may decrease.

That is, within the framework of tactics, Russia chooses a topic and, using most understandable examples, explains: because of the war in Ukraine, people will remain hungry, this is bad. This thesis is intended to reflect supposedly common sense. With the help of such messages and tactics, propagandists seek to establish the opinion that if a famine occurs, it will be Ukraine and the defending Ukrainians who are to blame.

In the conditions of the Russian aggressive war against Ukraine, anti-Ukrainian propaganda penetrates into all spheres of life: literature, music, cinema and other areas of culture. In particular, propagandists use the field of video games as a platform for relaying their “ideal” life scenario.

Russia finances its video game developers in every possible way so that they create mass products with “their own scenario”, which is beneficial to propaganda. Consequently, Russian products can offer their own alternative reality, disfiguring real facts and presenting it as reality. Players can have specific scenarios in their minds and they will perceive them as something real.

For example, the video game “Atomic heart” was recently released; a Russian company is developing this game. The game is positioned by the developers as retrofuturistic in the style of the USSR. It describes the events of the alternative history of the 50s, when the Soviet Union emerged from World War II as an absolute winner. In addition, it is scientifically and technically advanced, because it is able to create robots “replacing human labor”.

After the release of the game, scenes hinting at the criminal Russian war against Ukraine were found in it. For example, a flying drone that carries a pot of geraniums (an allusion to the Geranium kamikaze drone, a terrorist country launches into Ukraine and kills thousands of Ukrainians). In addition, the game has “beautiful Soviet photos” of Ukrainian Mariupol, Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia. That is, the bridge, which at that time did not hit Russian missiles. The game also found quotes about mentally handicapped “Nazi pigs” and a can of minced pork in a blue and yellow wrapper. The Ministry of digital transformation of Ukraine has called for limiting the distribution of this game in other countries due to its toxicity and the potential collection of user data information.

This is not a rare case of discrediting Ukraine with the help of Russian video games, because their only goal is to distort Ukrainian history, discredit domestic and foreign policy, and create a negative image of Ukraine among both foreigners and Ukrainians. Parasitizing on “alternative realities”, game developers fix certain images in the minds of the players. Therefore, such stereotypes are created that “Ukraine is the territory of Russia” or “The Soviet Union is the best education of mankind”.

Comparison with the standard of the negative (destruction of authority) is a propaganda tactic in which propagandists compare a new idea, process or person with an already known analogue that causes persistent negative emotions. In tactics, a certain logical flaw is applied: if A includes X and B includes X, then A = B.

Using this tactic, Russian propaganda is trying to convince both Russians and the whole world that Ukrainians are Nazis. In particular, Russians systematically find evidence of Nazism in the Ukrainian army. For example, they said that the uniform of the Ukrainian military was significantly changed after the 2000s and now it supposedly reflects the “reincarnation of Nazism”: rhombuses on shoulder straps instead of Soviet stars, the use of the “Nazi” edelweiss flower in the symbols of the units, as well as an artificially aged naval emblem of marine corps. Propaganda also considered Nazi symbols on military helmets, Ukrainian armored vehicles and even Ukrainian military awards. Moreover, allegedly the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Army Valerii Zaluzhnyi also has a “bracelet with a swastika”. Thus, the Russians are trying to promote the conclusion that if Ukrainian soldiers use Nazi symbols, then they share the same views as the Nazis during World War II.

They use the same tactics in relation to Volodymyr Zelenskyi - they say that he is not only supported by the same countries that supported Hitler, he even published the book “My Struggle” similar in name and style to “Mein Kampf” by Adolf Hitler. Russian propaganda also said that in Poland they allegedly issued a stamp with Zelenskyi in the image of Hitler. Or they said that Zelenskyi, during a visit to the United States, handed over to Congress the flag of Ukraine “with SS runes”. And during a meeting with the leaders of France and Germany, the Ukrainian leader “could not resist” and “carefully showed Z” standing near the German flag.

Another example is the comparison of the Ukrainian special services, in particular, the Security Service of Ukraine, with punishers. Russian propaganda uses this tactic mainly in the temporarily occupied territories, convincing people that if they are released, they will live even worse. Like, the SBU is preparing punitive operations in the liberated territories. Allegedly, people will be judged even for such “innocent” acts as baking bread or organizing football matches during the occupation. In this context, the tactics of comparison with the standard of the negative are combined with the tactics of labeling (punishers) and the replacement of concepts (punishment for crimes committed is given as repression against civilians).

A fake dilemma is a propaganda tactic in which the propagandists offer only two options. At the same time, in general, the “choice” option required by propaganda is obviously beneficial.

For example, the phrase “who is not with us is against us” has been well-known since Soviet times, it is a classic embodiment of the fake dilemma tactic. Either “you are with us” and enjoy all the privileges of “your own” - obviously a beneficial option - or “you are against us”: you are the enemy, and the attitude towards the enemies of the people in Soviet times was tough.

This tactic was used by Russian propaganda in the internal information space during the so-called “shared mobilization”. Russian men were also offered two choices: either go to the front to “defend homeland”, or join the ranks of “traitors”. Moreover, even in the manuals that were prepared in order to minimize the negative moods of the mobilized, that is, those who left Russia after the announcement of mobilization, they recommend ridiculing them, calling them “refugees” and “those who wait”, while emphasizing that words should be avoided that will hint to listeners that people left the country against their will.

The Russians also use this tactic in the temporarily occupied territories, offering Ukrainians Russian passports. The essence of the dilemma: either you get a Russian passport and have the opportunity to work, earn money and somehow survive; or, keeping the Ukrainian passport, you are an enemy. The danger lies in the fact that the effectiveness of tactics increases in direct proportion to the length of time under occupation. Many people are running out of resources, and hence the ability to resist the invaders.

“It’s your own fault” is one of the most common propaganda tactics both in the internal (Russian) and external information spaces. Propagandists transfer the responsibility for what has been done to the victim, causing them to feel ashamed or guilty, etc. For example, the authorities are bad, but the officials who violate the laws are not to blame for this, but the voters who voted for them. Like, you have what you have voted for.

Since the beginning of a full-scale war, Russian propaganda has been convincing that it is Ukraine that is to blame for the duration of the war. Like, if the Ukrainians had not resisted, the so-called “special military operation” would have already “achieved its goals” and ended. The propagandists also tried to transfer part of the blame to the West. They say that the supply of air defense systems and weapons to Ukraine only “increases the number of victims and prolongs the conflict”. These messages propagandists spread to the internal audience. They say that Ukrainians “asked for it” with their resistance.

Using such tactics, Russian propaganda shifts responsibility for Russian massive missile strikes to the Ukrainian army. They say that if Russian “high-precision” missiles had not been shot down with the help of Ukrainian “ridiculous” air defense systems, they would have hit “only military targets”, and civilians “would not have suffered”. In particular, propagandist Olha Skabieieva voiced this on the air of a Russian TV channel: allegedly, the Ukrainian military fires dozens of missiles from air defense systems that randomly move in the sky, do not hit Russian missiles, but collide with each other and fragments of these missiles fall into civilian buildings while Russian rockets reach their goals. So, Skabieieva explained the consequences of rocket attacks on Kyiv. Similar explanations were given about the reasons for the X-22 missile hitting a multi-storied building in Dnipro: the Russian missile allegedly flew clearly at a military target, and it was “unsuccessfully” shot down over the building.

The propagandists also spread messages that, thanks to Poroshenko, Ukraine had lost Crimea and part of the East, and thanks to Zelenskyi, the loss of territories was even greater. They say that it was not Russia that began to occupy Ukrainian territories in 2014, but the “it’s own fault” of Ukrainians who supported the Revolution of dignity (in the language of propagandists - “coup d'état”), elected Petro Poroshenko, and later Volodymyr Zelenskyi as presidents. 

“It’s your own fault” tactics is used in combination with the “substitution of concepts” technique.

Labeling (stereotyping) is one of the most common propaganda tactics. Propagandists provide the phenomenon/process they are working against with negative content using a deliberate name or characteristic that evokes negative associations. Less often, this tactic is used in a positive connotation such as calling a certain group of people heroes.

For example, Russian propaganda calls Ukrainian servicemen “militants”, “Nazis”, “neo-Nazis”. All these terms have a negative connotation and evoke associations of fear of the military. Thus, the propagandists are trying to level the image of the Ukrainian soldier as a defender of the Ukrainian people and Ukraine. At the same time, by combining labeling and substitution of concepts, Russian propaganda creates the image of a “defender of the fatherland” for Russian servicemen, despite the fact that they are fighting on foreign territory.

Another example is the use of the perverse label “independent” in relation to Ukraine. Propagandists deliberately do not translate the word “independent” into Russian, but create something in between. Thus, due to the caricature of the designation, propaganda forms a negative attitude towards Ukraine as a separate and independent state. Propagandists also use this label to nourish the narrative of “external governance in Ukraine”.

As for the use of stereotypes, this tactic is best demonstrated by the “inferior” attitude of Russians towards Ukrainians as “unreasonable, helpless younger brothers and sisters”. Despite the fact that Ukraine is historically the successor of Kyiv Rus, Kyiv is an older city than Moscow. After the collapse of the USSR, Russian rhetoric highlighted the “brotherhood of peoples”, “common culture”, “common values”. These stereotypes were also used in 2014. Like, “brother goes against brother” and “that's bad”. According to Russian propaganda, Ukraine, guided by “family feelings”, should not resist Russia.

Scaring (appealing to fear) is a propaganda tactic in which propagandists use fear or persistent prejudice to obtain a desired result. If you don't do / support what is being proposed, it will only get worse.

After the liberation of Ukrainian territories from invaders, the whole world learned about numerous war crimes by the Russian army, including crimes against children. After the liberation of Kyiv region in the spring of 2022, the atrocities of the Russians in Bucha became known. At the time, propagandists wrote that the photos and videos from Bucha were a provocation by Ukraine to get Western help and discredit the Russian army. At the same time, the Russian propaganda started spreading fakes about “punishing” Ukrainians who were under occupation for receiving Russian humanitarian aid. During the Ukrainian army's counteroffensive in Kharkiv region, propagandists began to work ahead of the curve, assuring that Ukraine would allegedly run the message that the Russians tortured civilians in occupied Kharkiv region. The Russians also claimed that the Security service of Ukraine (SBU) was preparing a punitive operation against citizens loyal to Russia in Kharkiv; they wrote that Ukraine would allegedly send “punishers” who would mock civilians and kill anyone who did not support Ukrainian nationalism. In other words, Ukrainians were being intimidated into believing that they would be worse off after liberation than they were during the occupation. The Russians used the same tactics during the liberation of Kherson: first they spread messages that Ukraine was preparing a “new Bucha” in Kherson, and then they began writing that “hell for civilians” was beginning in Kherson. They said that after liberation, the Ukrainian military began repressions against civilians. They also wrote that Kherson residents complained about the deterioration of life after the arrival of Ukrainian troops, saying that they did not want to live “in Russia”, and now they suffer in Ukraine. In other words, the Russians not only keep Ukrainians in the temporarily occupied territories in constant fear, but also convince them that after liberation their lives will be even worse. They say that Ukraine will consider everyone to be traitors and collaborators, so we must “put up with it” and support Russia.

Also, Russian propaganda uses scare tactics during massive missile attacks on Ukraine. Repeatedly during the air raid alert, they spread the message that allegedly the Ukrainian air defense system cannot cope with the massive shelling, allegedly the Ukrainian air defense system shoots down only ten percent of Russian missiles. They say that the Ukrainian authorities lie about the number of missiles and forbid showing the results of their hits in order to hide the real state of affairs. Allegedly, the presidential office exaggerates the effectiveness of the air defense system and “invents” missile attacks. After reports from the General Staff about the real effectiveness (over 64%) of the air defense system, propagandists manipulate that if the Ukrainian air defense system works as effectively as possible, the West no longer needs to supply Ukraine with weapons. The purpose of these messages is psychological pressure on Ukrainians at a time of emotional vulnerability, to increase panic and fear caused by shelling, and to discredit the Ukrainian army and government.

Another example of the intimidation Russia resorts to not only in Ukraine but also abroad is the use of nuclear weapons. These messages have been broadcast by propagandists both to Russian audiences and to foreign audiences since the start of the full-scale invasion. Also, the Russian army is constantly conducting “training” of strategic deterrence forces with launches of ballistic and cruise missiles codenamed “Hrim” (Thunder). The need for such “training” is justified by the fact that allegedly Ukraine, the US or NATO want / could launch a nuclear strike on Russia, so one should be ready for a “retaliatory strike”. Russian propaganda also periodically spreads fakes that allegedly Ukraine wants to use a “dirty bomb” and blame it on Russia. At the same time, Russia has begun to expand the “list of situations” in which a “preventive” nuclear strike is allegedly possible.

In this way, Russia resorts to nuclear blackmail and tries to induce Ukraine and other democratic states to negotiate on its own terms.

Appeal to authority is a propaganda tactic in which propagandists resort to quoting famous people or experts in a particular field to promote messages. Like, if the argument is in parallel with the statement of an authoritative person, then it is true.

Russian propaganda systematically quotes Western pro-Russian politicians or public figures to promote disinformation narratives. Russian propaganda presents the pro-Russian position of an individual as a generalized public opinion in a particular country.

For example, in order to create the illusion that even in the United States, more and more people “support Russia” or “understand Putin”, or “believe in the victorious power of the Russian army”, they use the American former military. One such expert is Colonel Douglas McGregor, ex-advisor of the head of the Pentagon. In 2014, McGregor supported the annexation of Crimea and spoke on RT, where he claimed that the inhabitants of Crimea were Russians, not Ukrainians. From the first day of the full-scale invasion, MacGregor predicted an imminent defeat for Ukraine. At the end of December 2022, Russian media quoted McGregor as saying that “almost nothing will be left of Ukraine” in the near future.

Another expert is Doug Bandow, an American scholar and columnist for The American Conservative. His quotes were used to promote messages about censorship and lies in the Ukrainian information space. In an op-ed, Bandow claimed that the Center for Counteracting Disinformation at the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine had formed a list of “naughty Americans who refuse to dance to the tune of the Zelenskyi and Ukrainian governments” (i.e., a list of pro-Russian experts). To fight with the Ukrainian Center, according to Bandow, the United States should also create a center to counter disinformation. In fact, The American Conservative has also repeatedly published materials in tune with Russian propaganda narratives.

Russian propaganda uses the Polish fake publication Niezależny Dziennik Polityczny (an independent political magazine) both to spread Russian propaganda in Poland and to quote the supposedly Polish publication in the Russian and Ukrainian information spaces. As Polish journalists found out, most of the publications on the website of this publication were literally copied from other portals; thus, the impression of a full-fledged media is formed. The publication's own materials are Russian propaganda and lies. For example, it was this publication that published fabricated statements by American generals that the Poles were drunkards, drug addicts, and thieves. Most of the texts are written in poor Polish, saturated with Russians, there are impossible language constructions in the texts. The editor of the publication, Adam Kaminsky, is a fictitious person. Instead of his photograph, a portrait of the Lithuanian traumatologist Andrius Zhukauskas was used. Among other things, this fake publication was used to promote messages that NATO is “supplying scrap to Ukraine”,that is, old, ineffective weapons, in order to “clean out warehouses” and “recycle old trash”.

Going personal is a propaganda tactic whose name comes from the Latin expression “Argumentum ad hominem (Argumentum ad personam)” - “an argument directed at a person”. Propagandists resort to personal attacks on the opponent when they cannot refute their arguments. Thus, they try to turn a losing situation into a “victory” by humiliating the opponent and distracting from the main topic.

For example, the spouses of Russian propagandists Yevhenii Popov and Olha Skabieieva resort to such tactics in their TV show “60 minutes about the essentials”. Guests were often invited to the studio, supposedly to represent Ukraine and Ukrainians. As soon as the arguments of these guests did not suit the hosts, they resorted to manipulation and going personal:

an explicit or veiled image of the interlocutors themselves;

manipulative use of phrases such as “as an intelligent person, you cannot contradict the statement …”; that is, they create a false dilemma for the interlocutor either to agree with the proposed unacceptable statement, or to argue and thereby contradict the statement “as an intelligent person”;

inappropriate appeals to authority such as “you are wrong, because we [in Russia] know better what is happening in Ukraine…”; that is, the further argumentation of propaganda is based on a logical flaw.

Thus, Russian propagandists on the air of the national TV channel formed the image of Ukrainians as stupid, uneducated, funny, helpless, “inferior” people.

Also, this tactic is used by the representative of the Russian foreign ministry, Mariia Zakharova, if the Russians cannot reasonably , in accordance with the norms of international diplomacy, respond to the statements of foreign leaders. For example, to the words of Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki that Russia poses a threat to Poland and Europe, Zakharova reacts with personal attacks against him.

Personality tactics are often combined with ridicule and substitution concept tactics.

Multiple repetition is one of the key tactics of Russian propaganda. The idea (thesis, slogan) is repeated many times in different sources of information until it is perceived as true. Television, radio, cinema, show business, literature, education, etc. are used to spread the idea.

For example, in 2014, after the occupation of the Crimean peninsula, Russians began to use the slogan “Crimea is ours!”. It sounded everywhere: in the official statements of Russian officials, in the media, in the statements of famous Russians, in humorous programs, etc. To reinforce the idea, Russian propagandist Andrii Kondrashov shot a documentary film for several hours - a reconstruction of the events of “Crimea. Way to the motherland” (meaning “return” to Russia). Due to the multiple repetition of the slogan in the form of a hashtag for social networks, a new version of its spelling appeared - “Krymnash” (Crimea is ours). In the Russian-language version of Wikipedia, such a transformation is called the “neologism of the Russian language”, which was allegedly recognized as the “word of the year”. The idea was endlessly repeated to the Russians that the temporarily occupied Crimea supposedly belongs to Russia. That is why they perceive it as true, despite the fact that not a single democratic state in the world has recognized the accession of the peninsula to Russia.

Another example of multiple repetition is the spread of the Russian narrative “Nazis/fascists came to power in Ukraine – Ukrainians need to be saved”. Since 2013, since the beginning of the Revolution of Dignity, Russian propaganda began to call the democratic processes in Ukraine a “coup d'état”, a “seizure of power”, power - a “junta”, a “Kyiv regime”. Also, messages about Ukrainian “nationalists”, “Nazis”, “Banderas” began to be promoted in the information space. That is, the propagandists combined the tactics of substitution of concepts with multiple repetition and fixed far-fetched messages as truthful. Finally, the narrative about the need to “liberate” Ukrainians from “Nazis/fascists” was used to justify the start of the so-called “special military operation”.

Devalue is a propaganda tactic that Russia uses to spread messages both in the internal (Russian) and external information spaces. Propagandists deliberately downplay the importance, effectiveness, or success of certain events, decisions, processes, and so on. Like, if some actions are “meaningless”, there is no point in continuing to do so.

For example, Russian propaganda uses devaluation tactics when covering the topic of Western sanctions against Russia. In particular, the EU has already introduced the ninth package of sanctions. In contrast, Russia accuses the West of “the irrationality and illogicality of the sanctions that provoked chaos and destabilization of world economic ties”. Russian propaganda is constantly trying to convince the world that the sanctions are invalid. That's why they need to be canceled. In fact, if the sanctions were inactive, Russia would not have to make so much effort to avoid them.

Also, Russian propaganda systematically devalues the Ukrainian army. Like, the Armed Forces of Ukraine are losing their combat capability. As if the Ukrainian military is already exhausted and the majority of people cannot stand the test of military realities. Allegedly, the United States no longer believes in Ukraine's military victory over Russia and considers the chances of success of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the battlefield “low”, and therefore will soon stop helping Ukraine. Russian propaganda also spread the message that it makes no sense to donate to the Armed Forces of Ukraine and help volunteers, because volunteer donations allegedly will not save the country, whose economy is bursting at the seams, and foreign partners are in no hurry to support it. In fact, the Ukrainian army has been protecting Ukraine and Ukrainians for almost a year now and is holding back the “second army of the world”, which planned to “conquer Kyiv in three days”. And foreign states systematically provide regular packages of military assistance in order to increase the defense capability of Ukraine.

Another example: the European Parliament supported a resolution recognizing Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism on November 23, 2022. After that, Russian propaganda began to spread messages that the European Parliament is extremists without real power, and the EU as a whole “sacrifices” its already “spoiled” reputation, calling Russia a state sponsor of terrorism. Thus, the propagandists tried to devalue the European institutions and their decisions on Russia.

The “beautiful people” tactic is one of the most common tactics of Russian propaganda inside the country, but it is also used in Ukraine. Propaganda messages are spread by attractive, successful, famous people such as TV presenters, bloggers, film actors, singers, writers, etc. Because of their recognizability, they become so-called “thought leaders”. This encourages other people to think that if they follow the same ideology, the same behavior, they will also be happy or successful.

This tactic is often used in advertising to increase product sales. It is also used to attract people to religious cults. Like, take an example from this person and come to us. Russian propaganda has also adopted this tactic and mainly uses it to spread propaganda in the domestic media space. In particular, actors and singers with Ukrainian roots who have Ukrainian relatives are used as a source of “true” information about events in Ukraine. Their fans, guided by the authority of idols, assimilate and spread this rhetoric. However, there are examples of the use of this tactic in the Ukrainian information space. Here are the materials of Detector Media for an explanation.

For example, after participating in the first season of the reality show “The Bachelor” with Maksym Chmerkovskyi (2011), Tetiana Pop became recognizable. At that time, she said that she had a business in Ukraine, and before that she worked on regional television in her hometown of Khust. Later, Pop appeared on Oleksii Durniev's show and was a participant in Russian TV shows “Mom in Law” and “Dom-2”. That is, the image of “a girl who suddenly woke up famous” stuck behind Tetiana Pop.

Since 2015, Pop has supported Russia and promoted Russian propaganda messages. In messages on the Vkontakte network, she called the participants in the Revolution of Dignity “conscious”, “Ukry” (“Ukrainians”); the authorities were called “junta”, and those who support this power were called “30% of morons”; she praised Stalin, and insisted that “Ukrainians, Russians and Belarusians are one people”, and “gays are sick people” who “should be punished”. Now this rhetoric has become even more aggressive. Pop has her own telegram channel with over 107 thousand subscribers and a Youtube channel with an audience of 65 thousand subscribers. On these resources, the propagandist tells how “citizenship and language” are being taken away from Ukrainians, about American biological laboratories in Ukraine and glorifies Russia. Now Tetiana Pop lives in Russia, so her audience is mostly Russians, but videos from her telegram channel are shared to the Ukrainian information space through a network of pro-Russian telegram channels.

Another example is Diana Panchenko, a pro-Russian journalist and TV presenter for NewsOne, First Independent and Ukrlive channels. They tried to create the image of a young, beautiful, successful TV presenter of Diana Panchenko, who has her own opinion and is not afraid to express it.

While working on television, Panchenko refused to call a war a war until it was “recognized by the Verkhovna Rada”; made Ukraine guilty of continuing hostilities; imposed on the audience the thesis that Ukraine does not want to return the Donbas if it does not agree to Russia's demands. Panchenko also helped Russia justify a full-scale invasion, admired the strength of Russian weapons, which even the United States seems to be afraid of. She supported Lukashenko during the protests in Belarus and even held a concert for him. She promoted the Russian version of Victory Day, demonized the Revolution of Dignity, etc. Now Panchenko is promoting a pro-Russian agenda in the Ukrainian information space through a Youtube channel (a little over 77,000 subscribers) and a telegram channel (almost 66,000 subscribers). Recently, the Security service of Ukraine (SBU) informed the propagandist about the suspicion.

Pro-Russian propaganda was also spread by another TV presenter, Oksana Marchenko, the wife of the pro-Russian politician Viktor Medvedchuk, who is the godfather of Russian President Putin and who was accused of high treason. Actually, Oksana Marchenko was also informed by the SBU about the suspicion.

Marchenko gained the greatest popularity thanks to the work in the projects of the STB TV channel “X-factor” and “Ukraine has got a talent”. Using popularity and financial opportunities, Marchenko advertised the Moscow Patriarchate Church for Ukrainians in the author's project “Pilgrim”. In the Russian-language product, Marchenko manipulates church norms, promotes the idea of “general reconciliation”, “submission”, etc. Moreover, in one of the episodes, Marchenko tells how “Ukrainians are killing each other and how nice it would be for them to come to their senses”.

Another indirect way to advance the pro-Russian rhetoric is silence. Quite a few Ukrainian artists who previously worked in Russia have resorted to such tactics. Since February 24, 2022, they have either disappeared from the public space or avoided commenting on the topic of the war. The repetition of such behavior by their fans is fraught with the fact that silence, and therefore the absence of resistance, plays into the hands of our enemy.

Enemy fiends is a propaganda tactic in which propagandists spread messages, manipulations and fakes that hyperbolically emphasize the negative qualities of Ukrainians (aggressiveness, vindictiveness, cruelty, etc.). The goal is to prevent compassion for the Ukrainians, moreover, to encourage the Russians to go to war as a “sacred mission”.

Russian propaganda used this tactic in the summer when covering the explosions in the Crimea. They wrote that supposedly Ukrainians are happy that war has finally come to Crimea. Information about the explosions at the airport really caused a strong reaction on social networks. But emotions are caused, first of all, by the significant losses of the enemy, because at the airfield in the temporarily occupied Crimea, the Ukrainian military destroyed the composition of aviation weapons and about a dozen aircraft systematically patrolling the airspace on the territory of Ukraine.

Somewhat modified Russian propaganda used the tactic of fiends - Ukrainians after the events in Brovary on January 18th. Russian propaganda began to spread messages that Russians sympathize with the deaths of Ukrainian children, unlike Ukrainians. Like, the Russians understand that Ukrainian children are not to blame for anything, Ukrainians call for the destruction of Russian children so that “orcs do not grow out of them”. In fact, Ukrainians showed condolences to the Russians even after 2014. However, a full-scale invasion significantly changed the situation. As of January 2023, due to Russian aggression in Ukraine, at least 459 children were killed, more than 909 were injured of varying severity. These figures are not final, since Russian war crimes, including against children, are being recorded and investigated in places of war fights and in the liberated territories.

Russian propaganda tried to make the “Ukrainians” inhuman by spreading messages on religious topics. They say that the “Kyiv regime” has turned Ukraine into a “totalitarian hypersect”, professing “neopaganism” as the basis of “radical nationalism”. The Russians wrote that allegedly the number of “Satanist sects” in Ukraine is unknown, but the countdown “is definitely in the hundreds”. So Ukraine needs to be “desatanized” and “deshaitanized”.

“Pass it on” is a conventional name for propaganda tactics. Russian propaganda formulates a message that evokes a sharp emotional reaction and calls for it to be spread as much as possible. Basically, the purpose of the message is to cause panic or destabilize the situation.

For example, Russian propaganda uses this tactic to spread fakes about the lack of blood. Reports say that there seems to be a shortage of blood both in clinics and in hospitals. Despite the fact that the Ministry of Health has repeatedly denied this information, reports of a lack of blood are always very actively spread on social networks. The goal is to destabilize the work of blood centers, because an unplanned influx of people who want to help increases the load on the system. Propagandists also seek to create emotional pressure on Ukrainians. Like, the state does not cope well with its tasks in a critical situation, so people suffer.

A message like “Attention!!! For tomorrow, Russia is planning a massive shelling of Ukraine. Rocket strikes will be on Kyiv, Dnipro, Odesa, Lviv ... Pass these coordinates on to your relatives. Perhaps, this will save someone's life” was massively distributed in various instant messengers and channels in the spring of 2022. Especially active such sharing happened on the eve of holidays or important events. The goal is to make Ukrainians nervous, increase stress, influence panic under the guise of “care and concern”. In reality, it is quite difficult to foresee Russian shelling.

What one should pay attention to:

source of information is named abstractly (military, acquaintances, friends of friends) or it is the one with very limited access (information from the Ministry of internal affairs, defense, Main intelligence directorate, etc.), it indicates manipulation;

checking information: for the most part, people in an emotionally excited state immediately share what they have written. However, checking the information is often simple. For example, the coordinates of objects that will supposedly be hit can be checked through a search engine (sometimes even the coordinates of Russian cities were distributed). Information about the lack of blood can be checked by giving a call to the institution mentioned in the message.

In fact, with the development of social media, messages like “Pass it on as there will be trouble”, “Pass it on as there will be no love”, “Pass it on and you will be happy” have become very popular. In fact, they were used to study emotional triggers for further use. Also, unscrupulous advertisers and scammers picked up the tactic and still use it.

Ridicule is a propaganda tactic designed to undermine and discredit the enemy. Propagandists rely on a psychological technique: if someone is funny, this should not be feared or taken seriously.

Russian propaganda uses this tactic to discredit Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyi. Propagandists distribute fake covers of French cartoon magazine Charlie Hebdo, Spanish satirical magazine El Jueves and German satirical magazine Titanik. They also spread fake messages about offensive graffiti allegedly painted in Berlin, Madrid, Paris, Warsaw. They depict Zelenskyi as cowardly, helpless or nasty. Thus, propaganda is trying to create the illusion that the Ukrainian president is despised and ridiculed abroad. Propagandists are trying to make Ukrainians feel ashamed of their leader and divide people because of their likes and dislikes towards Zelenskyi.

In anonymous telegram channels, a message was spread that supposedly Ukraine plans to protect the nuclear power plant from itself. Like, planning the construction of new NPP units, taking into account military threats, is ridiculous. Allegedly, only Ukrainians around the world dared to deliberately shell nuclear power plants. Like, there are no other “suicidal people” anywhere. In this case, the tactics of ridicule were combined with the tactics of substitution of concepts, claiming that Ukraine was deliberately shelling its own nuclear plants.

In Russian methodologies with instructions for journalists on how to cover the events of the Russian-Ukrainian war, propagandists advise using ironic names for Russians who left the country because they did not want to participate in the war. In particular, they are advised to call them “patriots who fled”, “perezhdun” (those who wait), “fugitives”, etc. Because of ridicule, the propagandists are trying to form a dismissive attitude towards the behavior of those who have left and spread the message: “if the Russians do not support Russia's war against Ukraine, they are not patriots, they do not deserve respect, they are not worthy”, and so on.

Reflection is a typical Russian propaganda tactic, used in particular to divert attention. Propagandists make the same accusations against Ukraine / USA / EU / ”collective West” as they bring against Russia. That is, they reflect the actions of the opponent. At the same time, Russian propaganda uses real and far-fetched pretexts for accusations.

An example of the use of reflection tactics is the accusation of the Ukrainian authorities of lying to Ukrainians that there are no losses in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. In practice, the expression “there are no losses in the armed forces of Russia” from the very beginning of the great war became a meme. It was Russia that for a long time did not recognize its losses, and then significantly downplayed them. On the other hand, the Ukrainian authorities have never denied the losses, moreover, they constantly note the price that Ukraine pays every day, although it does not clearly state the number of deaths.

The Russians also used the tactics of reflection to conceal the war crimes of the Russian army. After the liberation of the Kyiv region, it became known about the atrocities of the Russian army in the temporarily occupied territories. In particular, both Ukrainian and world media wrote about the war crimes of Russians in Bucha. Russia denied these accusations, calling them a staged and provocative act by the Ukrainian authorities. Further, during the counter-offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the Russians began to spread messages that Ukraine was preparing for “Bucha-2” in the Kharkiv direction and “new Bucha” in the Kherson region. After the publication of information about the numerous sexual crimes of the Russian military in the temporarily occupied territories, Russian propaganda began to accuse the military of the Armed Forces of Ukraine of the same crimes, but did not provide any evidence.

The main purpose of the reflection tactic is to divert attention from the subject of discussion or change the direction of the discussion. In English sources, it is called Whataboutism, as a derivative concept from the expression “what about”.